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CALIFORNIA RUNAWAYS
Although no longer a primary focus of media concern,' the run-
away problem increases yearly.2 The perspectives from which run-
aways are viewed and the methods by which they are handled are
currently being questioned at both state and national levels.
Prerequisite to an articulation of the most promising possibilities
for improvement is an understanding of the statutory procedures rele-
vant to runaways and the types of treatment to which these minors may
legally be subjected. Comparison of San Francisco's methods with
those of two neighboring counties reveals considerable variation within
the statutory framework and suggests that significant innovation may be
possible.3
Since court control of California runaways is justified by reliance
on the state incorrigibility statute,4 it is necessary to examine the the-
ories underlying this provision. Doctrines which have traditionally and
more recently been used to attack such laws suggest that certain changes
in the statute are not merely desirable but are, in fact, constitution-
ally mandated. 5
Recent federal legislation' demonstrates a congressional attitude
1. News coverage of the runaway phenomenon is presently limited largely to dra-
matic accounts of the fates of selected individuals. See, e.g., Stumbo, The Runaways:
Part I, Specter of Houston Haunts Parents, Los Angeles Times, Sept. 16, 1973, § 4
(View), at 1, col 4.
2. FBI statistics indicate over 100,000 runaway arrests in 1968. Hearing on the
Runaway Child Before the Senate Select Comm. on Children and Youth, Cal. Leg., Reg.
Sess. 111 (1973-74) [hereinafter cited as Cal. Hearing]. 1972 figures show that over
260,000 runaway arrests were made. Id. at 10. Informal estimates for 1973 indicate
over 1,000,000 runaways. Id. at 112 (testimony of B. Slattery, a director of Youth Ad-
vocates, San Francisco). Daily runaways from California homes average between 120
and 150. Id. at 2 (statement of M. Dymally, Chairman of the Senate Select Committee
on Children and Youth). California Youth Authority statistics provided separate fig-
ures for runaways in only two years, 1969 and 1970. Detentions in juvenile hall for
runaways in 1969 totaled 24,254. CALiFoRNYA YouTH AuTHolUTY ANNUAL REPORT,
1969, Table X-15, at 178. Figures for 1970 showed 25,012 such detentions. CALiuoR-
Nu. YoumH Au-ronrry ANNUAL REPoRT, 1970, Table 111-15, at 100.
3. See notes 33-108 & accompanying text infra.
4. The terms incorrigible, predelinquent, noncriminal, and person or child in
need of supervision (PINS, CINS) are all used to describe minors whose behavior sub-
jects them to juvenile court jurisdiction even -though they have committed no act deemed
criminal for adults.
5. See notes 109-213 & accompanying text infra.
6. Juvenile Justice & Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 1109-43 (cod-
ified in scattered sections of 18, 42 U.S.C.A. (Supp. 1975)).
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toward youth in general and runaways in particular 7 which is con-
sistent with constitutional standards. Moreover, the measure offers
funds to be applied toward development of alternatives to juvenile
court control over minors. 8  California's current legislative proposals9
must be assessed in terms of their ability to meet both federal funding
requirements and constitutional imperatives.' 0
Runaways Defined
The only characteristics uniformly attributed to runaways are
youth and absence from home," although definitions commonly men-
tion lack of permission," as well. While some authorities indicate
that length of time away is determinative,' 3 others mention specifically
that length of time is immaterial and focus instead on intent to re-
main away.' 4 Still others suggest that both length of time and intent
are relevant considerations.' 5
Contrary to the media image, most runaways never travel far
from their own homes. 16 Statistics reveal that female runaways out-
7. The Runaway Youth Act appears as Title I of the comprehensive act. Run-
away Youth Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 5701-02, 5711-13, 5715-16, 5731-32, 5751 (Supp.
1975).
8. See notes 214-73 & accompanying text infra.
9. A.B. 4307 (1973-74); A.B. 4279 (1973-74); A.B. 4120 (1973-74).
10. See notes 274-338 & accompanying text infra.
11. Even these terms are open to interpretation. The Office of Youth Develop-
ment in the Office of Human Development, Department of Health, Education, and Wel-
fare, specifies that runaways are persons under 18 who leave "home or an authorized
caring institution ... ." Cal. Hearing, supra note 2, at 9.
12. Juvenile Justice & Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 § 312(a), 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 5712; Cal. Hearing, supra note 2, at 9.
13. See, e.g., Cal. Hearing, supra note 2, at 9 (24 hours or more).
14. See, e.g., R. Shellow, J. Schamp, E. Liebow, & E. Unger, Suburban Runaways
of the 1960's, MONOGRAPHS OF THE SOCIETY OF RESEARCH IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT
(1967), reported in Hearingy on S. 2829, the Runaway Youth Act, Before the Sub-
comm. to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. 210, 216 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Shellow in Hearings].
15. See, e.g., In re D.J.B., 18 Cal. App. 3d 782, 786-87, 96 Cal. Rptr. 146, 149
(1971).
16. Hearings on S. 2829, the Runaway Youth Act, Before the Subcomm. to Inves-
tigate Juvenile Delinquency of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
150 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Fed. Hearings] (statement of W. Martin, Jr., Judge,
Superior Court, and C. Barthold, Chief Probation Officer, Superior Court, Clark County,
Indiana) (approximately 20% out of state); id. at 96 (exhibit of K. Armogida, San
Diego Youth Services, Inc.) (Police Department Juvenile Unit, July through September
1971, total number runaway contacts 928; San Diego County, 704; Cal., 108; other
states, 115; other countries, 1); id. at 80 (statement of Senator W. Mondale) (Minnea-
polis Police Department records showed 66o from city, 22% from suburbs, 12% from
outside metropolitan area); Cal. Hearing, supra note 2, at 113 (remarks of B. Slattery
of Huckleberry House, teen crisis center in San Francisco) (62% from homes in San
Francisco Bay area); id. at 41-42 (remarks of C. Reid, director of Fillmore-Fell Corp.
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number males, 17 an imbalance which results in part from parental tol-
erance for more aggressive behavior in male children. While boys find
it appropriate to "stay and slug it out," girls find escape from the home
to be a far more viable solution to conflict with parents.~8  In addition,
parents are more protective of their daughters, allow their sons more
freedom outside the home, and are less hesitant to report a girl's ab-
sence.19  Police, sharing these values, are quicker to take girls into
custody.20
Running away is also seen often as an escape for unsuccessful
students who find school stifling and limiting.2
Beyond these preliminary observations, runaways defy definition
in generalized terms. Race and affluence seem to have little to do
with the tendency to run; rather, the ethnic identity and economic status
of a particular group of runaways most often simply reflect the char-
acter of the neighborhood studied.22 Moreover, statistics are affected
by the attitudes of various groups toward leaving home: the more pro-
tective the family, the greater the tendency to assume that the child
has run and to report the absence. 23 The most accurate conclusion
seems to be that the runaway problem "pervades all classes of Amer-
ican society."'24
Further, there is no clear-cut relationship between family prob-
Group Home in San Francisco) (most runaways even stay within own districts); id. at
30 (remarks of R. ben David of FOCUS house in Las Vegas) (60.9% from Clark
County, Nev. area); Shellow in Hearings, supra note 14, at 218 (study in Washington,
D.C. suburb showed three-fourths stayed within metropolitan area).
The San Francisco Probation Department terms these local youths "runaways from
home." Interview with Frank Moran, San Francisco Juvenile Probation Officer, in San
Francisco, Cal., July 3, 1974 [hereinafter cited as Moran interview]; Cal. Hearing,
supra note 2, at 150-51.
17. Fed. Hearings, supra note 16, at 54, 80, 93; Cal. Hearing, supra note 2, at
29, 113; Goldmeier & Dean, The Runaway: Person, Problem, or Situation?, 19 CRIME
& DELiN. 539, 544 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Goldmeier & Dean]; Lemert, The
Juvenile Court-Quest and Realities, THE 'PREsIDEN''s COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCE-
MENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JusIcE, TASK FoRcE REPORT: JUVENILE DE-
LINQUENCY AND YouTH CRIME 91, (1967) [hereinafter cited as Lemert in TASK FORCE
REPORT]; see Fed. Hearings, supra note 16, at 155.
18. Interview with Jean Payne and Michael Brunelle, Family Crisis Intervention
Unit, Alameda County Probation Dep't, in San Leandro, Cal., July 1974 [hereinafter
cited as Payne & Brunelle interview].
19. Cal. Hearing, supra note 2, at 157-58.
20. Id. at 158.
21. Shellow in Hearings, supra note 14, at 230.
22. In light of the fact that most runaways stay close to home, this conclusion
is not surprising. It is natural that statistics in Montgomery County, Md., a suburb of
Washington, D.C., show most runaways to be white and middle class. See Fed. Hear-
ings, supra note 16, at 54.
23. Hildebrand, Reasons for Runaways, 14 CRIME & DELIN. 42, 45 (1968).
24. Cal. Hearing, supra note 2, at i50.
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lems and running away. For example, while some observers report
that most runaways seem to come from families in which the natural
parents' marriage is not intact,25 others conclude the opposite.20 Run-
aways frequently point to problems at home, but since their view of the
family is shared by most adolescents, the runaway's action can be
seen as one particular response to a common predicament. 27  One fre-
quent explanation for this response is that while adolescence is a nor-
mal time for upheaval, runaways feel less able than other youths to
turn to adults for guidance. 2S
From whatever perspective the runaway is defined, running
away cannot be seen solely as a negative, unbalanced, and impulsive
response. In many instances it may be the most intelligent, rational
act possible in the face of an intolerable situation. 29 One commentator
suggests that in an earlier day breaking away from the protection of
home to risk an encounter with the rest of the world was a respectable
pursuit. The chance of a few failures was understood and accepted
as part of growing up; children had lives to lead for themselves. It
is suggested that a modem turn toward "parent proving" through rais-
ing children, coupled with parents' dissatisfactions with the directions
their own lives have taken, has led to a demand that children remain
at home longer. Parents hope to cure -their own emptiness through
their children's success, and they must be certain that their children
are fully prepared to succeed before they venture forth. The educa-
tional system and the job market have similarly become focused on
long preparation as a prerequisite to success. 30  In the face of these
constraints, "[r]unaways are frequently among those adolescents who
are too shrewd, too questioning to accept comfortably the mere prom-
ise of adulthood in the indefinite future while pacified with privilege in
the present."'"
As well as being a rational decision, the break from home may be
a catalyst to resolution of family difficulties. Through running away,
the child may take on new power and for the first time acquire a strong
25. Fed. Hearings, supra note 16, at 33.
26. Id. at 123.
27. Cal. Hearing, supra note 2, at 121; Shellow in Hearings, supra note 14, at 228.
28. See, e.g., Goldmeier & Dean, supra note 17, at 542.
29. E.g., L. AMBROSINO, THE RUNAWAYS (1971), reported in Fed. Hearings, supra
note 16, at 238; Gough & Grilli, The Unruly Child and the Law: Toward a Focus on
the Family, 23 Juv. Jusnca 9, 10 (Nov. 1972); Gough, The Beyond-Control Child
and the Right to Treatment: An Exercise in the Synthesis of Paradox, 16 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 182, 195 (1971).
30. F. R. Marks, Detours on the Road to Maturity: A View of Society's Concep-
tion of Childhood-Growing Up and Letting Go, December 1973 (unpublished paper
at Childhood and Government Project, Earl Warren Legal Institute, University of Cal-
ifornia, Berkeley).
31. Shellow in Hearings, supra note 14, at 230.
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bargaining position from which he or she can effect changes which will
make home life tolerable. 2
Current Handling of Runaways in California
Procedures for police, probation department, and court handling
of runaways vary widely among counties. Investigation in connec-
tion with this note focused on San Francisco County and its eastern and
northern neighbors, Alameda County and Main County.3 3  Of the
three, San Francisco employs the most classical procedures, presents
the fewest options, and conducts the least experimentettion with alterna-
tives.
Police Encounters
San Francisco police rarely spot runaways on their own initiative;
they are usually alerted by parents' reports of missing or runaway chi-
dren 4 Police in smaller counties, naturally more familiar with local
juveniles, are more likely to recognize runaways.
In California, a policeman may detain and question any juvenile
whom he believes to be a runaway.35 If he has reasonable cause to
believe that the youth is subject to juvenile court jurisdiction,36 the offi-
cer may take the minor into temporary custody without a warrant. This
requirement is easily met, since even one runaway episode, if "suffi-
ciently serious, '' zr provides jurisdiction under section 601 of -the Wel-
fare and Institutions Code:33
Any person under the age of 18 years who persistently or
habitually refuses to obey the reasonable and proper orders or
directions of his parents, guardian, custodian or school authori-
ties, or who is beyond -the control of such person, or any person
who is a habitual truant from school within the meaning of any law
of this state, or who from any cause is in danger of leading an idle,
dissolute, lewd, or immoral life, is within the jurisdiction of thejuvenile court which may adjudge such person -to be a ward of
the court. 39
32. Kleinfeld, The Balance of Power Among Infants, Their Parents and the State,
4 FAMLY L.Q. 409, 439-40 (1970).
33. Alameda County displays a widely divergent economic, ethnic, and social rep-
resentation, containing, among others, the cities of Berkeley and Oakland. Matin
County is a predominantly affluent community.
34. Moran interview, supra note 16.
35. Pendergraft v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. App. 3d 237, 241, 93 Cal. Rptr. 155,
157 (1971).
36. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 625(a) (West 1972).
37. it re David S., 12 Cal. App. 3d 1124, 91 Cal. Rptr. 261 (1970).
38. Id. The petition in such a case would allege "beyond control" behavior. On
the other hand, a 601 petition alleging refusal to obey parents can be sustained only
if habitual behavior is found. In re Rita P., 12 Cal. App. 3d 1057, 95 Cal. Rptr. 430
(1970).
39. This section is commonly said to describe "incorrigible" children. In Cal-
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Once the officer has assumed temporary custody, he has three
alternatives: he may release the minor; release and present the minor
or his parent, guardian, or relative with a notice to appear before a
probation officer; or proceed directly to bring the minor before a pro-
bation officer. He is directed to take the least restrictive action com-
patible with "the best interests of the minor and the community."4
In some counties, this broad discretionary power has become a
mechanism for treating minors without probation department or court
intervention. For example, in Main County, two specially designated
police officers work exclusively with juveniles and frequently arrange
informal agreements between parents and runaways to seek counsel-
ing.4 Other counties have used funds specifically for the development
of police diversion programs.42
Release of runaways with notice to appear before the probation
department 3 is also used extensively in Marin County.44  Under this
system, commonly called "citation,"4 5 the parents lose custody only
during the brief initial contact with police.
Probation Department Control
If the officer determines that probation department intervention
is necessary, or if a parent brings a returned runaway to juvenile hall
ifornia, a separate code section describes delinquent minors, those who have committed
an act which would be a crime if done by an adult. See CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE
§ 602 (West 1972); cf. Note, Runaways: A Non-Judicial Approach, 49 N.Y.U.L. REV.
110, 115 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Runaways]. In all, 22 state juvenile statutes
have now separated incorrigibility sections from delinquency sections. Orlando &
Black, Classification in Juvenile Court: The Delinquent Child and the Child in Need
of Supervision, 25 Juv. JusrIcu 13, 17 (May 1974).
While "delinquent" is sometimes used in California to refer to an "incorrigible"
child as well as to a minor who violates a criminal law, the term as used in this note
refers to the latter.
40. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 626 (West 1972).
41. Interview with Jeanette Prandi, Marin County Juvenile Officer, in San An-
selmo, Cal., July 8, 1974 [hereinafter cited as Prandi interview].
42. In Santa Clara County, for example, police have used funds from the Califor-
nia Council on Criminal Justice to develop community services and to improve their own
counseling techniques. In one year they reduced by two-thirds the number of youths
brought to the probation department under section 601. Cal. Hearing, supra note 2, at
160-62. A similar police diversion program in Fremont, California, is implemented
through federal funding. Id. at 164. Other diversion programs are administered by pro-
bation departments. See notes 54-64 & accompanying text infra. For a comparison of
probation department diversion and police department diversion, see Stratton, Crisis In-
tervention Counseling and Police Diversion from the Juvenile Justice System: A Review
of the Literature, 25 Juv. JusricE 44 (May 1974).
43. CAL. WF.LF. & INST'NS CoDE § 626(b) (West 1972).
44. Prandi interview, supra note 41.
45. Id. Officially, the term "citation" denotes a notice to one having custody of
a minor to appear for a juvenile court hearing and bring the minor. CAL. WELF. &
INST'NS CODE § 661 (West 1972).
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claiming that the child is beyond control, the youth is subjected first to
a process termed "intake screening." 6  The probation officer must re-
lease the child unless one of several conditions exists, among them the
lack of a suitable home,47 the likelihood that the juvenile will flee the
jurisdiction of the court,4" and the absence of a parent, guardian, or
responsible relative willing or able to exercise care and control over
the minor. 9
A nonlocal runaway is invariably brought before the probation
department and is almost always detained, since the above conditions
are clearly applicable. On the other hand, detention is generally not
used for first-time local runaways. 5 Probation officers, recognizing
that running away is frequently a response to the family situation, gen-
erally try first to refer both the minor and the parents to community
agencies for counseling.51  This procedure is largely ineffectual in
places like San Francisco, where counseling facilities are inadequate.
Families in crisis might be willing to seek treatment, ,but long waiting
lists for counseling often mean that the crisis passes, old patterns re-
surface, desire for outside help fails, and the child runs away again. 52
Thus, "by default, runaways are presently dealt within [sic] the law
enforcement framework of the San Francisco Police Department and
the San Francisco Juvenile Probation Department.""3
Diversion
In contrast, probation officers in Alameda County are able to
make use of the knowledge that families in crisis are most amenable
to treatment. All first-time runaways brought to juvenile hall are di-
46. Intake screening is a process to determine first whether court action is required
or referral elsewhere is desirable and second what particular action or referral is appro-
priate. See TuE PRESEDENT'S CommssioN ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADmN-
ISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TAsK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YoUTm CRium
14 (1967), quoting U.S. CH.DEN's BuREAu, DEP'T OF HEW, PuB. No. 437, STANDARDS
PoR JUvEN LE An FmmY Couln-s 46 (1966).
47. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 628 (a) (2) (West 1972).
48. Id. § 628(a)(5).
49. Id. § 628(a)(1).
50. Moran interview, supra note 16.
51. This type of arrangement is compatible with section 654 of the Welfare and
Institutions Code, which provides that a probation officer may, with consent of a minor's
parent, undertake for up to six months the supervision of any minor who he finds is
or "will probably soon be" within juvenile court jurisdiction. This alternative does not
involve the filing of a petition, and violation of any treatment agreement is not equiva-
lent to violation of a court order. Nonetheless, the probation officer may file a petition
at any time within the six-month period. CAL. WELE. & INST'NS CODE § 654 (West
1972 & Supp. 1974).
52. Moran interview, supra note 16.
53. Cal. Hearing, supra note 2, at 151-52 (testimony of F. Moran, San Francisco
Juvenile Probation officer).
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rected immediately following intake screening to one of two Family
Crisis Intervention Units.54  In addition, approximately one-third of
the units' cases are received through call-ins from parents, police,
schools, or the children -themselves.55
The crisis intervention technique involves short, intensive therapy
as close as possible to the time of the eruption; the family remains to-
gether throughout.56  Probation officers working in the units conduct
five interviews with each family, adding sessions if the youth is further
involved with juvenile hail. Cases are normally kept open for six
months but are occasionally extended for ninety days. 57
Unit counselors concentrate on helping the family to clarify its
problems. Once the conflict areas are isolated, the family makes its
own decisions.5" Clarification of feelings usually leads to reconcilia-
tion and a renewed attempt to make home life tolerable. Neverthe-
less, if the youth has been leading a successful life as a runaway, has
been financially independent, and is happier away from home, the
family might arrange an emancipation agreement.5"
Available statistics indicate that the program has successfully re-
duced the average length of detention, the necessity for juvenile court
involvement, and the recidivism rates for youths booked for 601 viola-
tions.60 In addition, the program is particularly appealing because it
54. Alameda County Probation Dep't, Family Crisis Intervention Unit (depart-
ment pamphlet) 1 [hereinafter cited as FCIU Pamphlet]; Payne & Brunelle interview,
supra note 18. The units also handle other 601-type minors and a few types of 602
offenders. Id.; see FCIU Pamphlet, supra, at 1.
55. FCIU Pamphlet, supra note 54, at 1. From 5 to 10% of the youths contact
the units on their own, often while they are on the run. Children cited to probation
may also be referred to a unit, and police occasionally cite youths directly to the facil-
ity. Payne & Brunelle interview, supra note 18.
56. Payne & Brunelle interview, supra note 18; see FCIU Pamphlet, supra note
54, at 4. The program is modeled on the Sacramento 601 Diversion Project, a pilot
study begun in October 1970 through funds provided by the California Council on Crim-
inal Justice. The Sacramento probation department maintained a built-in control group
by using normal intake procedures three days a week and crisis intervention methods
the remaining days. Results indicated that the program drastically reduced department
expenses, recidivism rates, and percentages of those requiring detention, court hearing,
and probation. See Baron, Feeney & Thornton, Preventing Delinquency Through Diver-
sion: The Sacramento County 601 Diversion Project, 37 FED. PROB. 13 (1973).
57. FCIU Pamphlet, supra note 54, at 2.
58. Id.
59. Payne & Brunelle interview, supra note 18. For a general discussion of the
ramifications of emancipation, see Katz, Schroeder & Sidman, Emancipating Our Chil-
dren-Coming of Legal Age in America, 7 FAMILY L.Q. 211 (1973).
60. FCIU Pamphlet, supra note 54, at 4. Average custody time for minors
booked for 601 offenses has been reduced from 14 days to 1.5 days. The percentage
of 601 petitions filed, from 25 to 30% before the program, has diminished to 4 to 5%.
Payne & Branelle interview, supra note 18. Fewer than 5% of 4,000 Family Crisis In-
tervention Unit investigations required referral to juvenile court. FCIU Pamphlet, supra
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has never required outside funding, as the units were organized by re-
cruiting and training volunteers from the probation staff. 61 Decreased
recidivism and juvenile hall and court involvement have resulted in
savings which have allowed the unit to expand, as well.6"
The Alameda County Projects are now aimed primarily at treat-
ing relatively minor problems the first time they arise. Crisis interven-
tion is used neither for children already on active probation nor for
those with serious past problems. 63  Nevertheless, expansion of the cri-
sis intervention program is beginning to allow for treatment of a wider
range of youths.64
Detention
Brief Detention of Nonlocals
WHile nonlocal runaways are almost always detained initially, 5
the detention is normally continued only long enough for the officer
to contact the youth's parents, inform them of their child's where-
abouts, and have them arrange for transportation home. If all goes
smoothly, the minor is taken to the transportation, placed on it, and
released by the probation officer. If there is -time before the release,
the probation officer may conduct a brief counseling session with the
minor. 6  If it becomes apparent that a severe family problem has
prompted the child's flight, the probation officer may alert the proba-
note 54, at 4. Recidivism rates dropped significantly in terms of both subsequent 601
violations and more serious offenses. Id. at 4-5.
61. FCIU Pamphlet, supra note 54, at 2-3.
62. Id. at 5. Twelve deputies and two supervisors staff the San Leandro unit
seven days a week from 8 a.m. to 11 p.m. The Oakland unit, which began in 1972,
one year after the San Leandro project, provides five probation staff members five days
a week until 10 p.m. Id. All girls booked in Alameda County are sent to the San Le-
andro juvenile hall; all boys are processed at Oakland's probation center. Payne & Bru-
nelle interview, supra note 18.
63. FCIU Pamphlet, supra note 54, at 1.
64. Payne & Brunelle interview, supra note 18. Compatible with this trend is the
current development in Alameda County of a rule requirng at least three runaway mci-
dents before a 601 petition based on such activity may be filed. Id. This measure re-
flects increased recognition in the California courts that "if the standards of conduct pro-
scribed by section 601 are not carefully delineated, the statute could become a means
of systematic discrimination against young people who are thereby demed equal protec-
tion of the law." In re David S., 12 Cal. App. 3d 1124, 1127, 91 Cal. Rptr. 261, 263
(1970) (citation omitted); see In re DJ.B., 18 Cal. App. 3d 782, 96 Cal. Rptr. 146
(1971) (single runaway incident, without clarifying details, insufficient for 601 junsdic-
tion). It should be noted, however, that the crisis intervention technique might not be
the most effective method of handling a repeated runaway situation, where behavior has
become so routine that the family has already built up a soundly-defended system for
handling the occurrence.
65. See notes 46-50 & accompanying text supra.
66. Moran interview, supra note 16.
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tion department in the minor's home town to the situation and refer the
youth there. 7
Prolonged Detention
When any runaway, local or nonlocal, is detained for more than
forty-eight hours, excluding nonjudicial days, the entire procedural ma-
chinery of the juvenile court must be invoked, beginning with the fil-
ing of a petition 68 by the probation officer to have the minor de-
clared a ward of the court pursuant to section 601 of the Welfare and
Institutions Code. The petition generally alleges that the child is be-
yond parental control. 69  The juvenile court must hold a hearing
within the next judicial day after the filing of the petition to determine
whether there is cause to detain the child further.7 0  Nonlocal run-
aways are summarily detained on the grounds that detention "is a mat-
ter of immediate and urgent necessity for the protection of such minor
S. 71 or that "such minor is likely to flee the jurisdiction of the
court .... '72 Local runaways are detained if they have run away
before or if the probation officer finds that their family situations are
too strained for immediate return. 3
67. Prandi interview, supra note 41.
68. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 631(a) (West Supp. 1974); id. § 650 (West
1972). A petition is the juvenile court's equivalent of a complaint or information.
69. A nonlocal minor may be subject to 601 jurisdiction for "beyond control" be-
havior even though he or she has been given a notorized letter of permission to be away.
Parental control is explained as "such control as parents ordinarily exercise and the
phrase carries with it the implication of the purpose of parental control over such an
infant, that is, its proper care and support, the usual incidents of the exercise of control
over it." Marr v. Superior Court, 114 Cal. App. 2d 527, 530, 250 P.2d 739, 742 (1952).
Under this definition, any child who is physically absent from parental control can be
said to fall within section 601. Relying on this interpretation, Berkeley police in the
summer of 1970 arrested several hundred youths and had them sent home. Comment,
California's Predelinquency Statute: A Case Study and Suggested Alternatives, 60
CALIF. L. REv. 1163, 1168-74 (1972). An unsuccessful attempt to gain injunctive relief
against the policy was mounted in 1970. Youth Coalition for Self-Defense v. Berkeley
Police Dept., No. C-70-1682 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 1970). Nevertheless, substantially the
same results were achieved through action taken by the Berkeley City Council in June
1971. Cal. Hearing, supra note 2, at 69-70.
70. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 632 (West 1972). California is one of 12
states with a specific detention hearing requirement and one of 8 states which sets a
time limit of this kind. Ferster, Snethen & Courtless, Juvenile Detention: Protection,
Prevention or Punishment?, 38 FORDHAM L. REv. 161, 180-81 (1969).
71. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 636 (West 1972).
72. Id.
73. A study of 11 California counties indicated that high detention rates do not
necessarily result from high incidence of serious crimes. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME
& DELINQUENCY, LOCKING THEM UP: A STUDY OF INITIAL JuvENILE DETENTION DECI-
SIONS IN SELECTED CALIFORNIA COUNTIrES 118, 120-21 (1968). The wide discretion per-
mitted in section 636 offers some explanation for this phenomenon. In high rate coun-
ties, over two-thirds of the youths classified as runaways were detained. Sumner, Lock-
ing Them Up, 17 CRIME & DELIN. 168, 175 (1971). The author recommends that
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Court Proceedings
A date for a jurisdictional and dispositional hearing must be set
at the time that the probation officer files the petition to have the
youth declared a ward of the court. This hearing must be set for no
later than thirty days from the date the petition is filed, or no later
than fifteen days from filing if the minor is in custody at filing time.74
A nonlocal runaway has normally been sent home by this time. If -the
parents cannot pay or refuse to pay the return fare, the county usually
assumes financial responsibility for transportation.75
The court generally sustains a 601 petition if the runaway is a re-
peater. Pursuant to the finding of jurisdiction,76 the child may be
placed on probation for as long as six months without wardship; 77
or, as is the case with most repeaters, 78 he or she may be declared a
ward of the court.79
judges be required to make specific findings showing the necessity for detention. Id.
at 178-79; see Cooley v. Stone, 414 F.2d 1213 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Baldwin v. Lewis, 300
F. Supp. 1220 (E.D. Wis. 1969), rev'd, 44Z F.2d 29 (7th Cir. 1971) (failure to exhaust
state remedies before seeking federal habeas corpus). It is also suggested that alterna-
tive facilities including group homes, emergency shelter care, and mental health facilities
should be provided. Sumner, Locking Them Up, 17 CRixm & DELiN. 168, 179 (1971);
see Creek v. Stone, 379 F.2d 106 (D.C. Cir. 1967). Moreover, it is at least technically
possible for the child to be released to his or her home pending court hearing, as a find-
ing that a minor is subject to detention is viewed by probation officers as permissive
rather than mandatory. Moran interview, supra note 16.
74. CAL. WELF. & INsT'NS CoDE § 657 (West 1972).
75. Moran interview, supra note 16. A nonlocal runaway may also be returned
home pursuant to the Interstate Compact on Juveniles. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE
§ 1300 (West 1972). Article IV of the Compact provides for the return of runaways
and authorizes local officials to hold a minor up to 90 days on reasonable information
that he or she is a runaway. The youth may be accompanied home and the returnee
state pays the expenses. Provisions are also made for return when the returnee state
requests delivery of the child. The Compact is normally used only for the return of
serious offenders, partially because the only state Compact officers are in Sacramento
and Los Angeles, and pickups of youths are infrequent, necessitating long detentions in
juvenile hall. In addition, it was believed until recently that the Compact could be used
only for transportation of Youth Authority commitments. Moran interview, supra note
16. All but two states are currently Compact states. Fed. Hearings, supra note 16, at
166.
76. The hearing may be continued for a maximum of 30 days from the time the
petition was filed, or, if the child is to be in custody, for 10 days from the finding of
jurisdiction, so that the probation officer can prepare a social study. CAL. WELF. &
INST'NS CODE § 702 (West 1972). The court may, for good cause, continue the hearing
for an additional 15 days if the minor is not detained. Id.
77. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 725(a) (West 1972). This type of probation,
though subject to the same time limit as informal probation, described in note 51 supra,
does involve a court order, the violation of which could subject the minor to a finding
of jurisdiction under section 602.
78. In San Francisco, approximately 85% of the runaway repeaters are declared
wards of the court. Moran interview, supra note 16.
79. CAL. WELP. & INST'NS CODE § 725(b) (West 1972). Wardship does not nec-
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Disposition
A variety of dispositional alternatives await a runaway ward of
the court. These include probation for an indefinite period8" coupled
with return home, placement in -the home of a relative or foster par-
ent, or commitment to a private8l or local public institution.82 In ad-
dition, any youth adjudged within the court's jurisdiction under section
601 may be committed to the Youth Authority"3 if he or she violates
a court order.8 4  Technically, then, any further runaway incident fol-
lowing a 601 adjudication could lead to Youth Authority commit-
ment. 5
Within this basic framework, -the actual type of treatment which
a child will receive depends largely on the county in which he or she
lives. In San Francisco, the runaway repeater is commonly placed on
indefinite probation and returned home. The overloaded probation
officer, frequently untrained in family counseling, is able to provide
only minimal services to the child -and parents.86 If home life remains
essarily imply harsher consequences for the minor, but it is a prerequisite for any dis-
position involving either probation for longer than six months or removal of the minor
from the home. Wardship generally denotes a shift of control over the child from the
parent to the state which is not subject to a six-month time limit.
80. Indefinite probation usually involves one year of probation followed by a re-
view by the probation department, which may recommend dismissal or extend probation
for another year. Probation is sometimes dismissed after nine months if the minor has
made extensive progress. California Continuing Education of the Bar, Juvenile Court,
Tape 2, Ist half (1973).
81. Some of the private institutions are locked facilities, such as Convent of the
Good Shepherd in San Francisco. Cal. Hearing, supra note 2, at 156.
82. Local public institutions include juvenile homes, ranches, camps, and forestry
camps run by the county. If there is no local institution available for placement, a mi-
nor may be committed to the county juvenile hall. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 730
(West 1972).
83. The California Youth Authority is the department of state government respon-
sible for the rehabilitation of juvenile delinquents and young adult offenders. It is the
juvenile equivalent of the adult Department of Corrections. Following commitment to
the Youth Authority, a juvenile is sent to a reception center where diagnosis determines
to which state institution the child will be sent.
84. See CAL. WELF. & INS'NS CODE § 602 (West 1972 & Supp. 1974). Violation
of a court order subjects a youth found to be described by section 601 to an adjudication
of delinquency under section 602.
85. Normally, commitment to the Youth Authority is reserved for the most
chronic or serious juvenile offenders. Nevertheless, in a county with severely limited
resources, Youth Authority commitment may be the only available alternative for a sec-
ond-time runaway. Interview with Ron Baylo, Director of Children's Treatment Center,
Main County Probation Department, in San Rafael, Cal., July 10, 1974 [hereinafter
cited as Baylo interview]; cf. Cal. Hearing, supra note 2, at 153 (testimony of F.
Moran) (Youth Authority commitment for chronic runaways).
86. Cal. Hearing, supra note 2, at 152-53 (testimony of F. Moran, San Francisco
juvenile probation officer).
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intolerable or the child has "failed to reform" on probation, removal
from the home follows. 87
Out-of-home placement is substantially easier for males than for
females in San Francisco. Foster home placements of girls are difficult
to find, as there are "few foster parents who are willing to take on the
problems in a foster home that 13 through 18 year old females exhib-
it."88 If a girl is given foster placement and runs from it, she is invari-
ably placed in a private "lock-up" institution if a space can be
found.89 Moreover, while males may be placed at such county-main-
tained facilities as Log Cabin Ranch and Hidden Valley Ranch, the only
public institution for females is the Girls Treatment Center, which can
house only twelve girls. The Treatment Center hesitates to take run-
aways because it is not a lock-up facility.90
The comparative lack of girls' facilities therefore results in a high
percentage of Youth Authority commitments for runaway girls, as the
Youth Authority is frequently the only available placement for a girl
who runs away from a private institution. 9' Thus, what began as a
problem within the family, in the setting of home and community, can
result in concentration on the child's behavior alone and total isolation
of the youth from the context and source of the problem.92
In contrast, -the Manin County93 probation department has de-
veloped a facility which aims precisely at helping children to learn to
live comfortably both in their families and in their communities. An
estimated two-thirds of the youths at the Children's Treatment Center
87. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 726 (West 1972). The removal and change
in placement are made pursuant to a supplemental petition filed without allegation of
additional offenses. Id. § 777(a).
88. Cal. Hearing, supra note 2, at 38 (testimony of C. Reid, Fillmore-Fell Corp.
Group Home, San Francisco). Runaway houses, though legally able to accept place-
ments, disfavor too close an affiliation with the juvenile court system and are therefore
reluctant to accept probation department referrals.
89. Id. at 156 (testimony of S. Bassett, juvenile probation officer, San Francisco
Juvenile Court).
90. Id. at 155.
91. Cal. Hearing, supra note 2, at 156 (testimony of S. Bassett); cf. note 85 supra
Authorities in Marin and Alameda Counties did not find girls' placements comparatively
scarce. One Main probation officer felt that placements were equally available for both
sexes. Interview with James Scanlon, juvenile intake screening probation officer, in San
Rafael, Cal., July 8, 1974. A Marin juvenile officer felt that referrals are in fact more
available for females. Prandi interview, supra note 41. The Main Children's Treat-
ment Center generally accommodates equal numbers of males and females. Baylo inter-
view, supra note 85; see notes 93-99 & accompanying text infra. Alameda County's
larger Family Crisis Intervention Unit is located at the female juvenile hall facility.
92. See Cal. Hearing, supra note 2, at 157 (testimony of S. Bassett, San Francisco
juvenile probation officer).
93. Marin County is an affluent suburban community adjacent to San Francisco
County.
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have been runaways, although many were brought to the attention of
the court through related offenses.94 The Center is an unlocked facil-
ity and treats roughly equal numbers of boys and girls.9 5 It offers three
distinct types of treatment: residential, day care, and after care.96
Most of the youths at the facility are wards of the court;97 the remain-
der are referred from intake screening at juvenile hall. 98
The children referred to the Center are generally those who the
probation department feels have family-centered problems, the resolu-
tion of which will probably result in a successful return to the commu-
nity. Even when it is found that a child is unable to return to his or
her own parents, placement is to a foster home in the same area.
The average residential stay is four months, during which time parents
and sometimes the rest of the family make weekly visits to meet with
the child. The return home is gradual, beginning with limited expo-
sure to home and the surrounding community three or four weeks
before the departure from the Center. The next step involves home
or foster home residence on a trial basis. If the adjustment is success-
ful, the child remains at home, and the Treatment Center provides
after care help in dealing with school, peer relationships, and family. 9
Both the Matin County Children's Treatment Center and the
Alameda County Family Crisis Intervention Unit demonstrate a de-
sire to use probation staff to provide runaways with treatment which
focuses on the broad problems which caused the child to leave home.
Moreover, treatment requires participation from everyone involved; it
does not single out the child as the sole culprit. Services in San Fran-
cisco, on the other hand, involve parents tangentially at best and ap-
pear to furnish the child with little more than resting places on an in-
evitable journey to the Youth Authority.
94. Baylo interview, supra note 85.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. Thus, while the Alameda County experiment deals largely with first-time
runaways, the Main County facility is concerned primarily with repeating runaways or
runaways with additional problems.
98. Id. Wardship is a prerequisite for residential treatment. The day care pro-
gram, however, is open to a variety of minors who are able to function at home but
for whom probation does not offer sufficient guidance. Id.
99. Id. See Goldmeier & Dean, supra note 17, wherein the authors suggest that
the three areas in which clear differences between runaways and nonrunaways are evi-
dent are school (runaways tended to show less interest in school, poorer performance,
and less ability to get along with teachers and counselors), peer relationships (when in
trouble, runaways tended to turn for help more to peers than to adults), and family in-
teractions (runaways felt that their homes lacked warmth, provided them with overly
strong discipline, and were marked by unhappy parental or parental-step-parental rela-
tionships).
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Treatment Outside the System
Independent, Community-Based Facilities
Those minors who manage to avoid the attention of the police,
the probation department, and the juvenile court may find shelter and
counseling through a variety of community resources. One of the most
longstanding and widely used facilities is the runaway house. The
first house, originally called Huckleberry's for Runaways, opened
June 18, 1967, in San Francisco. 10 Another well-established facility,
known initially as Berkeley Runaway Center, is located in Alameda
County. Today, there are over 200 such programs.'
Both Huckleberry's and the Berkeley Runaway Center have been
expanded to provide a comprehensive range of services to youth.'0 2
Nevertheless, both still maintain residential units. Huckleberry's can
accommodate a maximum of six youths for up to thirty days if they
have a parent's or guardian's permission. The house also serves as a
crisis center, open at all times to offer free medical and legal assist-
ance, as well as individual, group, and family counseling and foster
placement services. 0 3 The Berkeley program offers similar services.
Both organizations have been funded by a variety of public and
private donors.'04 Nevertheless, the two programs see the need for
more government assistance for themselves and those like them.'0°
Since both Huckleberry's and the Berkeley Runaway Center are
licensed residential institutions, 0 6 referrals may be made to them by
the courts. They value their independence highly, however, and share
the feeling that too much connection with the juvenile justice system
will lead to a breakdown in the trust which they find essential to their
effectiveness.'07 In this connection, both feel hindered by the legal
100.: CaL Hearing, supra note 2, at 112 (testimony of B. Slattery, codirector of
Youth Advocates).
101. Id.
102. Huckleberry House is now called Youth Advocates, and the Berkeley Runaway
Center is currently known as Berkeley Youth Alternatives. In addition to providing
services for youth in crisis situations, both aim at helping minors with more ordinary
school and personal problems so that leaving home might not be necessary. See Cal.
Hearings, supra note 2, at 110; id. at 67-68 (testimony of E. Horn, executive director
of Berkeley Youth Alternatives); Fed. Hearings, supra note 16, at 33.
103. Cal. Hearing, supra note 2, at 110-11.
104. Youth Advocates has received federal and local -assistance and funds from
United Crusade, private foundations, and individuals. Cal. Hearing, supra note 2, at
110. Berkeley Youth Alternatives' donors include individuals, churches, foundations, the
City of Berkeley, and, more recently, the County of Alameda under a revenue-sharing
program. Id. at 67-68.
105. Fed. Hearings, supra note 16, at 48; Cal. Hearing, supra note 2, at 76.
106. Fed. Hearings, supra note 16, at 34; Cal. Hearing, supra note 2, at 67.
107. Interview with Richard Janapaul, San Francisco Juvenile Probation Officer, in
San Francisco, Cal., July 3, 1974.
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requirement that to avoid prosecution for harboring runaways or for
contributing to the delinquency of minors, they must insure that chil-
dren do not stay overnight without parental permission. As a result,
they must often send away youths who most need their help.
108
Personnel involved with a variety of programs for runaways,
both within and outside the juvenile justice system, stress the need for
increased community and family involvement and diminished juvenile
court control. Naturally, the shift away from court regulation requires
development of additional community-based treatment facilities. Re-
cent judicial opinions have suggested several perspectives from which
jurisdiction over runaways may be challenged. Moreover, state and
federal legislators have begun to offer means by which this jurisdic-
tion may be effectively eliminated.
Proposals for Fundamental Change
Current programs for dealing with California runaways all must
take into account the fact that the youths are ultimately subject to
the court's jurisdiction under section 601 of the Welfare and Institu-
tions Code, generally termed the incorrigibility statute. 0 9 When 601
jurisdiction is asserted over runaways, it is most commonly grounded
on a finding either that the child is beyond parental control or that
the child's repeated runaway behavior is evidence of habitual refusal
to obey reasonable parental orders." 0 Present runaway programs
must therefore focus either on avoiding 601 adjudication or on provid-
ing humane and relevant treatment for those found to be described
by the statute.
Section 601 concerns only youths who have done no act for
which an adult could be found criminal. To justify its control over
these youths, the juvenile court system historically has relied on sev-
eral notions. First, the courts have presumed that children are incom-
petent to determine what is best for their own welfare."' Second, the
juvenile courts have asserted that their proceedings are not criminal
in nature and that they are aimed at rehabilitation rather than pun-
ishment. 2  Finally, the courts have explained that judges, probation
108. Cal. Hearing, supra note 2, at 74.
109. See note 39 & accompanying text supra.
110. See notes 37-3 8 & accompanying text supra. The "lewd and immoral" portion
could easily be applied, as well.
111. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 169 (1944); cf. Developments
in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1190, 1212
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Civil Commitment]. This comment is principally con-
cerned with civil commitment of the mentally ill, but its analysis of the state's exercise
of its parens patriae and police powers over classes of people who have committed no
crimes is equally applicable to children described by statutes such as section 601.
112. Note, Parens Patriae and Statutory Vagueness in the Juvenile Court, 82 YALE
L.J. 745, 748 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Parens Patriae & Vagueness].
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officers, and police are able to predict that certain behavior is "pre-
delinquent" and that if it is allowed to proceed unchecked, it will lead
to a life of delinquency or crime." 3
These notions allow for two distinct types of control over minors
described in section 601. The type most frequently articulated is the
state's power as parens patriae, to protect those who cannot see
to their own well-being. 114  The applicability of this form of control
to incorrigible youths rests chiefly on the notions of the child's incom-
petence and the court's protectiveness. Equally important is the
state's police power, its authority to protect the public from harmful
elements within the society."15 The notion that the behavior described
in section 601 forecasts future criminality is the primary basis for in-
yoking this type of control.
The state's ability to use these powers over minors has been nar-
rowed in recent years, as the validity of the underlying notions has
been seriously challenged. For example, the predictability concept
has been questioned" 6 and eroded by empirical data showing that
most runaways do not get into other trouble, either before or after
the runaway episode."17  That the child is incapable of acting for his
or her own welfare has been disputed by commentators discussing such
areas as custody proceedings, compulsory education, employment, and
voting."' Finally, the courts themselves have explicitly questioned
the supposed noncriminal nature of juvenile proceedings.
This judicial questioning has resulted in substantial limitations of
the state's powers over juveniles. In In re Gault,"9 the Supreme
Court held that juveniles in the adjudicatory stage of proceedings to
determine delinquency, in which institutionalization might result, are
entitled to most of the same procedural safeguards afforded adults
113. THE PRESmENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMnIsTRA-
TON OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELiNQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIM 8-
9 (1967); Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REv.,
1187, 1192, 1233 (1970); Lemert in TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 17, at 99; see, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 53, 62 A. 198, 200 (1905). It is this third con-
cept which has traditionally formed the basis for courts' decisions as to which of the
youths who have done no act unlawful for adults will be required to come before the
court.
114. Civil Commitment, supra note 111, at 1208-09.
115. Id. at 1222.
116. E.g., Glen, Juvenile Court Reform: Procedural Process and Substantive
Stasis, 1970 Wis. L. REv. 431, 442; Lemert in TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 17, at
99.
117. Shellow in Hearings, supra note 14, at 224.
118. E.g., ASSEMBLY OFFICE OF RE EARCH, CALIFoRNIA LEGISLATURE, LEGISLATIVE
PROPOSALS, CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY SYMPOSIum ON SERVICES TO CHILDREN AND YOUTH
6-9 (1974) [hereinafter cited as SYMPosium LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS].
119. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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in a criminal proceeding. 120  The Court based its holding principally
on its consideration of the consequences of a delinquency adjudica-
tion, finding that the severe deprivation of liberty which could result
belied the supposedly rehabilitative aims of the juvenile court sys-
tem. The court determined that "[t]he essential difference between
[Gault's] case and a normal criminal case is that safeguards avail-
able to adults were discarded in [Gault's] case.' 12 1  The decision in
Gault opened several avenues of attack on the incorrigibility stat-
utes.12 2
The Void-for-Vagueness Attack
The most persistent attack against incorrigibility statutes has
been grounded on the theory that these statutes violate the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment through their vagueness. 23  The
applicability of the void-for-vagueness doctrine is generally based on
two grounds. First, by analogy to the Gault rationale, it is argued
that the severity of the possible consequences attendant upon a finding
120. Id.
121. Id. at 29.
122. In states which do not have separate incorrigibility statutes, these attacks are
similarly applicable to the sections of delinquency statutes referring to incorrigible mi-
nors. General application of the conclusion; in Gault to the incorrigibility statutes has
been questioned on the ground that the Court carefully limited its holding to the adjudi-
catory stage in a juvenile proceeding "by which a determination is made as to whether
a juvenile is a 'delinquent' as a result of alleged misconduct on his part, with the conse-
quence that he may be committed to a state institution." Id. at 13. The original find-
ing of delinquency in Gault's case, however, was based on two grounds: (1) violation
of a law proscribing the use of vulgar or obscene language in the presence of a woman
or child, which made him subject to ch. 80, § 2, [1941] Ariz. Sess. 158, as amended,
ARIz. REv. STAT. ANNi. § 8-201 11 8-9 (1974) as "[a] child who has violated a law of
the state or an ordinance or regulation of a political subdivision thereof" and (2) past
and present conduct bringing him within former subsection 6(d) of the same statute as
"[a] child who habitually so deports himself as to injure or endanger the morals or
health of himself or others." Ch. 80, § 2, [1941] Ariz. Sess. 158, as amended, Aiuz.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-201 12 (1974). Section 8-201 subsumed both law violations and
the standard incorrigibility charges under the "delinquency" rubric. Therefore, the
Court's limitation of its holding to delinquency can be construed to encompass incorrigi-
bility. This construction seems particularly persuasive when, as in California, a finding
of jurisdiction based on incorrigibility can result in commitment to a state institution,
not in the original disposition, but as a consequence of violation of a court order pursu-
ant to the original proceedings. See note 84 & accompanying text supra. Eventual com-
mitment to a state institution under an incorrigibility adjudication has been prohibited
in at least one state. In re Ellery C., 32 N.Y.2d 588, 300 N.E.2d 424, 347 N.Y.S.2d
51 (1973).
123. The standard for a finding of unconstitutional vagueness is set forth in Con-
nally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926): "[A] statute which either forbids
or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential
of due process of law." Id. at 391.
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of incorrigibility dictates that the statutes be judged by standards nor-
mally applied to criminal laws.12 4  Therefore, these statutes must pro-
vide fair warning of the conduct proscribed and must furnish clear
guidelines for enforcement so that they may not be subjectively ap-
plied.125 Second, it is proposed that the specific requirements of Gault
cannot be met by a vague statute, since a "central infirmity of a vague
statute is that its vagueness makes other due process guarantees mean-
ingless.' 2 6
Initially, the success of the void-for-vagueness attack was limited
to juvenile statutes dealing solely with older juveniles' T or with statutes
allowing criminal prosecution; 28 the courts uniformly rejected its ap-
plication to incorrigibility statutes.'29 Nevertheless, two recent deci-
sions have applied the doctrine to this area. In Gonzalez v. Mail-
liard,.30 a three-judge federal district court in California, dealing di-
rectly with section 601 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, rendered
a declaratory judgment that the portion of the statute concerning a
minor "in danger of leading an idle, dissolute, lewd, or immoral life
124. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Mailliard, No. 50424 (N.D. Cal., Feb. 9, 1971) at viii-
ix & n.9, vacated and remanded for reconsideration of grant of injunctive relief, 416 U.S.
918 (1974). Moreover, the opinion in Gonzalez points out that "vagueness may be a
constitutional infirmity in either criminal or civil statutes." Id. at viii; accord, In re
E.M.B., No. J 1365-73 (D.C. Super. June 14, 1973) at 31, rev'd sub nom., District of
Columbia v. BJ.R., No. 7651 (D.C. App. Jan. 27, 1975); see note 140 infra. See also
Comment, Juvenile Statutes and Noncriminal Delinquents: Applying the Void-for-
Vagueness Doctrine, 4 SEroN HALL L. Rzv. 184, 198 (1972); Parens Patriae & Vague-
ness, supra note 112, at 755-56.
125. See Parens Patriae & Vagueness, supra note 112, at 746-47. The similarity
of these statutes to criminal statutes also opens them to attack on the separate but related
ground of overbreadth. Cf. id. at 748 (describing overbreadth as an element of vague-
ness).
126. Gonzalez v. Mailliard, No. 50424 (N.D. Cal., Feb. 9, 1971) at xi, vacated and
remanded for reconsideration of grant of injunctive relief, 416 U.S. 918 (1974); Com-
ment, Juvenile Statutes and Noncriminal Delinquents: Applying the Void-for-Vague-
ness Doctrine, 4 SaTON HALL L. REV. 184, 188 (1972); Note, Juvenile Court Jurisdiction
over "Immoral" Youth in California, 24 STAN. L. REv. 568, 580 (1972); Parens Patriae
& Vagueness, supra note 112, at 756.
127. See, e.g., Gesicki v. Oswald, 336 F. Supp. 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). But see Mat-
tiello v. Connecticut, 395 U.S. 209 (1969), dismissing appeal for want of a properly pre-
sented federal question, 4 Conn. Cir. 55, 225 A.2d 507 (App. Div. 1966).
128. People v. Munoz, 9 N.Y.2d 51, 172 N.E.2d 535, 211 N.Y.S.2d 146 (1961).
129. E.g., In re Daniel R., 274 Cal. App. 2d 749, 79 Cal. Rptr. 247 (1969); People
v. Deibert, 117 Cal. App. 2d 410, 256 P.2d 355 (1953); Commonwealth v. Brasher, 359
Mass. 550, 270 N.E.2d 389 (1971); In re L.N., 109 N.J. Super. 278, 263 A.2d 150 (App.
Div.), aff'd mem., 57 NJ. 165, 270 A.2d 409 (1970), cert. denied sub nom., Norman
v. New Jersey, 402 U.S. 1009 (1971).
130. No. 50424 (N.D. Cal., Feb. 9, 1971), appeal docketed, 39 U.S.L.W. 3500
(U.S. Apr. 9, 1971) (No. 1565, 1970-71 Term; renumbered No. 70-120, 1971-72 Term),
vacated and remanded for reconsideration of grant of injunctive'relief, 416 U.S. 918
(1974).
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. .." was void for vagueness and enjoined further assumption of
jurisdiction under that clause. On appeal, the United States Supreme
Court vacated the judgment and remanded the cause to the district
court for reconsideration of the grant of injunctive relief.131  The
Court's directions on remand indicate, however, that the declaratory
aspect is still valid.'32 Thus, Gonzalez serves warning that the re-
maining portions of section 601 may be similarly vulnerable13 and
indicates that the entire statute, if it is to survive at all, must be clari-
fied through amendment and judicial construction.' 34
131. 416 U.S. 918 (1974).
132. The Court directed that the district court on remand consider Steffel v.
Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974), and Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967), in deter-
mining the propriety of the injunction. In both opinions, the Court distinguished re-
quirements for declaratory relief and those for injunctive relief. The Court in Zwickler
found that declaratory relief was proper regardless of the propriety of granting an injunc-
tion. Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 253-55 (1967). In Steffel, the Court found that
the declaratory judgment procedure is an alternative to injunctive relief, properly used
to test the constitutionality of state statutes when federal intervention is appropriate.
Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 466-67 (1974); see Cleaver v. Wilcox, No. 72-1980
(9th Cir. June 7, 1974) at 6. Although the opinion in Zwickler does suggest that the doc-
trine of abstention may prevent declaratory relief when a statute is attacked for vague-
ness rather than for overbreadth, abstention would not seem appropriate in Gonzalez.
The court in Gonzalez explicitly considered the abstention question and concluded that
since "California courts have repeatedly interpreted § 601 and given the terms under
consideration here a broad reading ...the Court does not believe that justice would
be served by sending plaintiffs back to the state courts for yet another state interpreta-
tion." Gonzalez v. Mailliard, No. 50424 (N.D. Cal., Feb. 9, 1971) at v-vi, vacated and
remanded for reconsideration of grant of injunctive relief, 416 U.S. 918 (1974); cf.
Cleaver v. Wilcox, No. 72-1980 (9th Cir., June 7, 1974) at 5. The Supreme Court's
directions indicate that this conclusion was warranted.
133. In fact, the court in Gonzalez specifically pointed to the "reasonable and
proper" and "beyond control" portions of section 601 as potential targets for a void-for-
vagueness attack. Gonzalez v. Mailliard, No. 50424 (N.D. Cal., Feb. 9, 1971) at xiv
n.13, vacated and remanded for reconsideration of grant of injunctive relief, 416 U.S.
918 (1974).
134. Recent California decisions have attempted to define the terms of section 601
more precisely. A literal reading of section 601 has led courts to conclude that since
the words "persistently or habitually" modify the phrase "refuses to obey the reasonable
and proper orders or directions of his parents" while the phrase "or who is beyond the
control of such person" is unmodified, disobedience must be habitual for a finding of
601 jurisdiction, while a petition can be sustained on a finding of one sufficiently seri-
ous "beyond control" act. Compare In re Rita P., 12 Cal. App. 3d 1057, 1060, 95 Cal.
Rptr. 430, 431 (1970), with In re David S., 12 Cal. App. 3d 1124, 1127-28, 91 Cal.
Rptr. 261, 263 (1970). More recent cases have tempered the strict literalism of these
interpretations. In In re D.J.B., 18 Cal. App. 3d 782, 96 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1971), the
court indicated that both length of time away from home and intent to remain away
are relevant to a finding of a "sufficiently serious" act. Lacking this evidence, the court
could not conclude that the simple act of leaving home without permission constituted
grounds for 601 jurisdiction based on "beyond control" behavior. Id. at 786-87, 96 Cal.
Rptr. at 149. The opinion in In re Henry G., 28 Cal. App. 3d 276, 104 Cal. Rptr.
585 (1972), suggests that the "sufficiently serious" criterion of In re David S. and In
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In a second recent case, In re E.M.B.,"' 5 a Washington, D.C.,
superior court found that that jurisdiction's equivalent of section 601
was unconstitutionally vague in its entirety, as it provided neither fair
warning nor clear guidelines for enforcement. As in Gonzalez, the
court relied heavily on the deprivations possible upon an incorrigibil-
ity adjudication. 13 6  In its holding, the District of Columbia court sug-
gested that invalidation of the statute did not mean that the juvenile
court could never acquire jurisdiction over predelinquent minors.
Nevertheless, it added that an acceptable statute would have to be
narrowly drawn and would permit jurisdiction only if "the child's past
behavior over a significant period of time is so potentially harmful to
the child that a temporary deprivation of his or her liberty . . . is
necessary for the protection of the child."'' t7 In other words, such a
statute must stem from the parens patriae power of the state. The
state may invoke its police power over nondelinquent youths only if
they are the same minors over whom its parens patriae power must be
exercised. 138
The decision in In re E.M.B. was recently reversed by a District
re DJ.B. is likewise to be applied to a situation in which several "beyond control" acts
are alleged. Id. at 283, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 589-90. In addition, the court proposed that
evidence tending to show that the loss of control was a result of the parent's own fail-
ings would preclude 601 jurisdiction. In so finding, the court indicated that the "reason-
able and proper" limitation on parental orders required literally only for jurisdiction
based on habitual disobedience is also to be implied in "beyond control" determinations.
The court reasoned that unless this limitation is affixed to both portions of the statute,
"beyond control" petitions could become a convenient method of avoiding the more rig-
orous requirements of the "refusal to obey" section. Id. at 284, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 590;
cf. Gonzalez v. Mailliard, No. 50424 (N.D., Cal., Feb. 9, 1971) at xiv n.13, vacated
and remanded for reconsideration of grant of injunctive relief, 416 U.S. 918 (1974)
(suggests "persistent" should be applied to "beyond control").
135. No. J 1365-73 (D.C. Super. June 14, 1973), rev'd sub nom., District of Co-
lumbia v. BJ.R., No. 7651 (D.C. App. Jan. 27, 1975).
136. Id. at 33-36. The code section in question was D.C. CoDE § 16-2301(8) (A)
(iii) (1973). Subsections relating to truancy and offenses "committable only by chil-
dren" were not involved in this case and thus not covered by the void-for-vagueness hold-
ing.
137. In re E.M.B., No. J 1365-73 (D.C. Super. June 14, 1973) at 46, rev'd sub
nom., District of Columbia v. BJ.R., No. 7651 (D.C. App. Jan. 27, 1975).
138. Thus, the court in In re E.M.B. cast further doubt on the notion that "incorri-
gible" behavior forecasts future criminality from which society must be protected. Sec-
tion 16-2301(8)(B) of the District of Columbia Code, which requires that any "child
in need of supervision" (the equivalent of a 601 minor) must be found to be "in need
of care or rehabilitation" is compatible with this focus on the child. See D.C. CODE
§ 16-2301(8)(B) (1973). New York law similarly requires dismissal of the petition
unless the court concludes that the youth is in need of treatment. N.Y. FAMILY Cr.
Acr § 743 (McKinney 1963); Runaways, supra note 39, at 116. But cf. CAL. WELF.
& INsTr'Ns CODE § 782 (West 1972) (judge may dismiss petition if finds minor needs
no treatment); id. § 734 (court must find probable benefit for Youth Authority commit-
ment). Section 601 itself contains no such qualification.
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of Columbia appellate court.13 9 While the court did address the lower
court's finding of vagueness on the face of the statute, it seems to have
based the reversal chiefly on the conclusions that the statute was not
vague as applied to appellee and that the doctrine of facial overbreadth
was not available to her. 140
The Right to Treatment
While the holding in Gault concerned only the requirements
of procedural due process in the adjudicatory stage of delinquency
hearings, the Court indicated a connection between the need for im-
posing such safeguards and the failure of the juvenile courts to afford
juveniles the "special consideration and treatment" thought to be a
"quid pro quo" for procedural informality. 14' The opinion in Gault
mentioned further the assertion by some courts that proper treatment
is a prerequisite to juvenile custody and that, as a result, "a juvenile
may challenge the validity of his custody on the ground that he is not
in fact receiving any special treatment."'1 42
The Gault Court's focus on the possible consequences of juvenile
proceedings thus provides the nexus between the void-for-vagueness
attack on incorrigibility statutes and a separate ground for challenge,
the notion of a juvenile's right to treatment. The two methods of at-
tack, however, use this focus in opposite ways. Since the vagueness
argument is commonly used for questioning penal statutes, its effective-
ness in challenging juvenile statutes is enhanced when a cogent an-
alogy can be drawn between juvenile law and penal law. The attack
against vague language is, therefore, most convincing when the con-
139. District of Columbia v. B.J.R., No. 7651 (D.C. App. Jan. 27, 1975).
140. As to the specific issue of facial vagueness, the appellate court concluded only
that the statute is as specific as possible, that it is not an ordinary criminal law, that
it is designed to support parental responsibilities, and that it has been revised to comport
both with model juvenile provisions and with the most innovative state measures. Id.
at 4-6. As an example of this statutory innovation, the court cited the elimination of
"troublesome language" which gave the juvenile court jurisdiction over youths engaging
in "immoral" activities. Id. at 5. In a footnote, the court indicated that while "im-
moral clauses are impermissibly vague, the remaining portions are not similarly vulner-
able. Id. n.3. But see note 133 & accompanying text supra. In the remainder of the
opinion, the court emphasized that the statute was not vague as applied to the appellee,
a chronic runaway. See id. at 3-4, 6. In rejecting the right of appellee to question the
facial vagueness of a statute clearly applicable to her, the court limited its discussion
primarily to a treatment of the requirements for facial overbreadth attacks. Id. at 6-
9. Even though a similar argument might well be made concerning facial vagueness at-
tacks (see Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974)), the fact that the appellee cannot chal-
lenge the statute is not determinative of its sufficiency. The appellate court's superficial
treatment of the broader vagueness question suggests that one whose acts do not fall so
squarely within the statute might successfully challenge it.
141. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 22-23 n.30 (1967).
142. Id. at 23 n.30.
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sequences upon adjudication are most severe. The right to treat-
ment concept, on the other hand, leads to the conclusion that incorri-
gibility statutes may be valid even though they are imprecise so long
as dispositions under the statutes provide adequate treatment for each
child.
The right to treatment has been recognized in a variety of cases
concerning noncriminal custody, including a number of juvenile
cases.' 43  Several courts have likewise found that the right is consti-
tutionally mandated by either the proscription of cruel and unusual
punishment, the equal protection clause, or the due process clause.'
44
In Donaldson v. O'Connor,145 Judge Wisdom, writing for the Fifth
Circuit, found a due process right to treatment both in cases where
confinement is based purely on a state's parens patriae power 146
and in cases where it is grounded on a combination of parens pat-
riae and police power 47 rationales. In the latter category, which in-
cludes juvenile incorrigibility proceedings, 48 the court determined
that governments must provide a quid pro quo, customarily rehabil-
itative treatment, 49 whenever confinement is permitted without the
limitations applied to criminal proceedings.' 50 These limitations con-
sist of the finding of a specific crime, the setting of a specific term, and
the provision of fundamental procedural safeguards.' 5 ' The court
recognized the commitment of juveniles as one of the "major forms
of 'nonpenal confinement' 152 requiring a quid pro quo.'
The clearest statement of the applicability of the concept to in-
143. The concept "has been applied to the mentally ill, sexual psychopaths, defec-
tive delinquents, persons committed following acquittal by reason of insanity, drug ad-
dicts and children, whether delinquent or merely in need of supervision." Martarella
v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575, 598 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); e.g., Creek v. Stone, 379 F.2d 106,
111 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (juvenile detention); Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 457-58
(D.C. Cir. 1966) (civil commitment).
144. Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575, 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); see, e.g., Nelson
v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1974) (Fourteenth Amendment due process right to
treatment for institutionalized juveniles); Morales v. Turman, 364 F. Supp. 166 (E.D.
Tex. 1973) (Fourteenth Amendment due process right to treatment).
145. 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 171 (1974).
146. See note 114 & accompanying text supra.
147. See note 115 & accompanying text supra.
148. See notes 114-15 & accompanying text supra.
149. Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 522 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 95 S.
Ct. 171 (1974).
150. Id. at 524.
151. Id. at 522.
152. Id. at 524.
153. Id. at 524-25. The court noted that cases involving confinement of juveniles
belonged to the group of nonpenal confinement cases with a heavy parens patriae em-
phasis. In defective delinquent cases, on the other hand, the state's police power is fore-
most Civil commitment of the mentally ill generally involves both rationales equally.
Id. at 524-25.
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corrigibility statutes has issued from the New York courts.154  Most
recently, the court of appeals in In re Ellery C.11' concluded that
PINS 156 children, the equivalent of California's 601 minors, may not
be placed in a state training school, since confinement with delin-
quents' 57 could not be deemed treatment. 5  The court also stressed
that the lack of other facilities could not justify such confinement. 159
In Martarella v. Kelly,'60 the Federal District Court for the Southern
District of New York found that juveniles in long-term detention' 6'
without adequate treatment suffered deprivations of constitutional pro-
portions.' 62 Moreover, in a supplemental opinion, 6 the court de-
fined "treatment"'64 and described minimum conditions necessary for
implementing an adequate "treatment plan.' 65
The California courts have not addressed the notion of a mi-
nor's right to treatment as directly as the New York courts. Never-
theless, in In re William M.,166 the state supreme court, denouncing
detentions based solely on stereotypical classifications, emphasized that
the requirement that each minor receive individualized treatment
aimed at rehabilitation is the "basic predicate of the Juvenile Court
Law .. ,167 This statutory right to treatment can be found in
the purpose clauses of both the Juvenile Court Law' 68 and the Youth
Authority Act, 69 as well as in sections involving dismissal of peti-
tions,17 0 commitment to the Youth Authority,171 and extension of Youth
154. See, e.g., In re Jeanette P., 34 App. Div. 2d 661, 310 N.Y.S.2d 125 (1970).
155. 32 N.Y.2d 588, 300 N.E.2d 424, 347 N.Y.S.2d 51 (1973).
156. Persons in Need of Supervision.
157. The term refers to those found to have committed criminal acts. In re Ellery
C., 32 N.Y.2d 588, 590, 300 N.E.2d 424, 425, 347 N.Y.S.2d 51, 52 (1973).
158. Id. at 591, 300 N.E.2d at 425, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 53.
159. Id. at 591-92, 300 N.E.2d at 425, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 53.
160. 349 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
161. Long-term detention is defined as 30 days or more of continuous detention.
Martarella v. Kelley, 359 F. Supp. 478, 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (supplemental opinion).
162. Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575, 601-02 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). See also
Lollis v. New York State Dep't of Social Services, 322 F. Supp. 473 (1970), modified,
328 F. Supp. 1115 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (treatment of PINS youth constituted cruel and un-
usual punishment). The court in Martarella did not, however, find any constitutional
violation in joint custody of PINS and delinquents. Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp.
575, 596 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
163. Martarella v. Kelley, 359 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
164. Id. at 484.
165. Id. at 483; see id. at 483-86; Runaways, supra note 39, at 123; cf. Donaldson
v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 525-26 (5th Cir. 1974) (right to treatment presents justici-
able controversy).
166. 3 Cal. 3d 16, 473 P.2d 737, 89 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1970).
167. Id. at 31, 473 P.2d at 748, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 44.
168. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 502 (West 1972).
169. Id. § 1700 (purpose to substitute treatment and training for retribution).
170. Id. § 782. See note 140 supra.
171. Id. § 734.
[Vol. 26
CALIFORNIA RUNAWAYS
Authority jurisdiction beyond the normal statutory limits. 72
The Least Restrictive Alternative
The opinion in Gault also suggested a third route by which in-
corrigibility statutes may be challenged. In discussing the state
court's handling of Gault, the Court criticized the failure of the trial
judge to explore the possibility that Gault could receive adequate treat-
ment at home.7 3  In a footnote, the Court referred to "the possible
duty of a trial court to explore alternatives to involuntary commitment
in a civil proceeding 174 and cited Lake v. Cameron, 75 a civil com-
mitment proceeding in which the court found that a committing court
must explore available alternatives and choose the least restrictive
one.
176
It is suggested by one commentator that this duty arises when-
ever the state's power may be used to infringe fundamental personal
liberties,'177 at least where the purposes of such infringement are said
to be rehabilitative rather than retributive.17 8  Since these rights may
be limited only when necessary to further a substantial state interest,
the availability of an equally effective, less restrictive alternative pro-
hibits use of the more severe infringement. 79  The author proposes
that the fundamental liberties involved in civil commitment proceed-
ings include not only the freedoms of travel, exercise of religion, and
association, 80 but also the independently cognizable freedom from in-
carceration. 8'
It seems evident that the duty to seek the least restrictive altema-
172. Id. § 1801 (continuation of treatment); see In re Gary W., 5 Cal. 3d 296,
486 P.2d 1201, 96 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1971) (if no treatment, may seek release through ha-
beas corpus).
173. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 28 (1967); see Chambers, Alternatives to Civil Com-
mitment of the Mentally Ill: Practical Guides and Constitutional Imperatives, 70 MICH.
L. REa. 1107, 1163 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Chambers].
174. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 28 n.41 (1967); see Chambers, supra note 173, at
1163.
175. 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
176. Id.; see Chambers, supra note 173, at 1141.
177. Chambers, supra note 173, at 1155; see Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488
(1960).
178. See Chambers, supra note 173, at 1165-66. In the context of the juvenile
court system, the articulated purpose of jurisdiction is always said to be rehabilitative.
This purpose remains constant regardless of whether jurisdiction is asserted in the name
of the state's police power (i.e., for the protection of others) or in the name of its parens
patriae power (i.e., for the protection of the child). When these powers are exercised
over minors who have not violated any criminal law, the rehabilitative purpose is even
more clearly required.
179. See Civil Commitment, supra note 111, at 1246.
180. Chambers, supra note 173, at 1167.
181. Id. at 1162-64, 1167-68.
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tive arises in juvenile proceedings as well as in civil commitment of
mental patients, especially when, as in the case of an "incorrigible"
minor, the juvenile has violated no criminal law."" As a result of this
duty, commitment must be allowed only if there are no equally effec-
tive methods of treatment available short of commitment. 183
In Morales v. Turman,18 4 the Federal District Court for the
Eastern District of Texas used this doctrine to determine that institu-
tionalization of delinquents was constitutionally permissible only for
those juveniles found through expert diagnosis to be unsuited for any
less restrictive type of rehabilitative treatment.8 5 Moreover, the court
adopted an expansive view of the doctrine,'8 6 finding that the Consti-
tution requires not only that a state use existing alternatives wherever
feasible, but also that it modify current programs and create new com-
munity-based facilities to insure the availability of less restrictive alter-
natives. 8 7
In California, the least restrictive alternative doctrine finds sup-
port in both ,the state constitution and the Welfare and Institutions
Code. The notion that freedom from incarceration is an independ-
ent fundamental right is bolstered by the specific statement in the
Declaration of Rights 8 that both the right to liberty and the right of
privacy8 9 are inalienable rights possessed by all people.' 90
The doctrine also permeates the Juvenile Court Law.'' For
182. In fact, Chambers cites the decision in Gault, in which the need for funda-
mental procedural safeguards was based on the deprivations of liberty involved in insti-
tutionalization, as one of the first examples of Supreme Court recognition of a funda-
mental right to freedom from incarceration. See Chambers, supra note 173, at 1163.
183. This conclusion embodies the narrowest view of the least restrictive alternative
doctrine. A broader view, in support of which Chambers says that there is also au-
thority in Supreme Court decisions, would require a less restrictive, less effective al-
ternative if a court determined that in a particular situation the individual's interest in
freedom outweighed the state's interests. Chambers, supra note 173, at 1184-85.
Chambers recommends the narrower view, at least as a first step. Id. at 1187-89.
184. 383 F. Supp. 53 (E.D. Tex. 1974).
185. Id. at 125.
186. The duty to use a less restrictive, less effective alternative involves a somewhat
different expansion of the doctrine. See note 183 & accompanying text supra.
187. Morales v. Turman, 383 F. Supp. 53, 125 (E.D. Tex. 1974). The court re-
quired the supplementation of foster home, supervised probation, and parole programs
and the creation of such facilities as group homes, halfway houses, day care programs,
out-patient clinics, and home placements with close supervision. This "decentralization"
program was to be accomplished through a plan drafted by experts after conferences
among experts, amici, parties, and attorneys. Id. at 125-26.
188. CAL. CONST. art. I.
189. The right to privacy portion was added by amendment in 1972.
190. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1; cf. Morales v. Turman, 383 F. Supp. 53, 124 (E.D.
Tex. 1974). The court in Morales recognized an institutionalized juvenile's right to
freedom from excessive and arbitrary restrictions on movement, privacy and speech.
191. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE §§ 500-945 (West 1972 & Supp. 1974).
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example, an express purpose of the Juvenile Court Law is that a child
is to be removed from parental custody "only when his welfare or
safety and protection of the public cannot be adequately safeguarded
without removal."'192 Furthermore, even when removal is necessary,
substitute custody must be "as nearly as possible equivalent to that
which should have been given by [the minor's] parents."' 93 The most
explicit expression of the least restrictive alternative doctrine appears
in the direction that when an officer, having taken a child into tempo-
rary custody, is considering whether to release the minor completely, to
release the youth with a notice to appear before a probation officer,
or to take the child directly before the probation officer, he "shall pre-
fer the alternative which least restricts the minor's freedom of move-
ment, provided such alternative is compatible with the best interests of
the minor and the community."'"" The doctrine also limits the dispo-
sitional options available upon adjudication. The Juvenile Court Law
specifies that a child adjudged a ward or dependent child of the
court may be removed from the home only when the parent has not
provided proper maintenance, 195 probation has been tried unsuccess-
fully, 19 6 or the removal is otherwise required for the minor's welfare.'97
The least restrictive alternative doctrine is compatible with both
the void-for-vagueness concept and the idea of the right to treatment.
In In re E.M.B., 9 6 the District of Columbia court which declared the
incorrigibility portion of its statute unconstitutionally vague' 99 stressed
that one of the requirements for any statute authorizing jurisdiction
over juveniles who have violated no criminal law is that it specify that
temporary deprivation of liberty is permissible only "where no other
alternative is available .... .
Similarly, the right to the least restrictive alternative may be
described as "[a]n important incident of the right to treatment
.... ,,201 A child's right to adequate treatment is fully realized only
192. CAL. WELF. & INSr'NS CODE § 502 (West 1972).
193. Id.
194. Id. § 626.
195. Id. § 726(a).
196. Id. § 726(b).
197. Id. § 726(c).
198. No. J 1365-73 (D.C. Super. June 14, 1973), rev'd sub nom., District of Co-
lumbia v. BJ.R., No. 7651 (D.C. App. Jan. 27, 1975); see notes 139-40 supra.
199. See notes 135-39 & accompanying text supra.
200. In re E.M.B., No. J 1365-73 (D.C. Super. June 14, 1973) at 46, rev'd sub nom.,
District of Columbia v. B.J.R., No. 7651 (D.C. App. Jan. 27, 1975); see notes 139-40
supra.
201. Morales v. Turman, 383 F. Supp. 53, 124 (E.D. Tex. 1974). In this connec-
tion, the court found that while institutionalization of juveniles is not unconstitutional
per se, Texas's juvenile institutions were "on the whole incapable of fulfilling the consti-
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if it is provided in the least restrictive equally effective context
possible.202 It may be argued further that if treatment within the com-
munity is in other respects as effective as that provided within an
institution, the very fact that it is given in the community necessar-
ily renders it more effective. Since the "incorrigible" child's prob-
lem arose in the home and the community, and since the minor will
return to this context, only a facility which provides contact with
the community can fully rehabilitate the child.2 °s
In relation to runaways, recognition of the validity of -the least
restrictive alternative doctrine is particularly crucial. While the
void-for-vagueness doctrine may lead to repeal of section 601, a stat-
ute could easily be drafted which describes runaways in terms suffi-
ciently specific to withstand an attack based purely on vagueness.
Furthermore, the right to treatment criteria could conceivably be met
by innovative programs which nonetheless involved institutionaliza-
tion and unnecessary control. When the least restrictive alternative
doctrine is grafted onto each of these two original theories, however,
the conclusion emerges that no degree of statutory specificity and no
amount of improved treatment can abridge a nondelinquent minor's
freedom from institutional control, as long as effective treatment may
be provided in a less coercive manner.
The Ideal
Successful attacks against the incorrigibility statutes have resulted
in judicial demands both for increased specificity in describing which
nondelinquent minors may be subject to juvenile court jurisdiction un-
der section 601 and for more careful limitation of the dispositional
alternatives which may be imposed once jurisdiction is found. It may
be argued further, however, that any form of juvenile court control
over minors who are neither neglected 0 4 nor delinquent 0" is inappro-
priate. Indeed, a logical extenson of the least restrictive alternative
doctrine would seem to require that if effective treatment can be af-
forded "incorrigible" minors by personnel and facilities totally divorced
tutional requirement that each institutionalized juvenile receive rehabilitative treatment."
Id. at 124.
202. Cf. Civil Commitment, supra note 111, at 1320, in which the commentators
suggest another relationship between the two doctrines. The state in its police power
r6le may require even mere custody under humane conditions for the mentally ill patient
who is dangerous to others. Nevertheless, the least restrictive alternative doctrine would
require that if any treatment were available, it would have to be provided, since treat-
ment is less restrictive than mere custody.
203. See Morales v. Turman, 383 F. Supp. 53, 124 (E.D. Tex. 1974). See notes
93-99 & accompanying text supra.
204. See CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 600 (West 1972).
205. Id. § 602.
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from the juvenile justice system, neither the parens patriae power of
the state nor its police power can validly be invoked.
The battle for repeal of section 601 has been waged for years.20 6
On a practical level, arguments for repeal have been increasingly en-
hanced by such phenomena as medical emancipation of minors,20 7
judicial and legislative decisions to limit juvenile court powers, and in-
creasing numbers of successful alternative programs. Assuming that
sufficient numbers of adequate treatment programs can be developed
independent of the law enforcement framework, and assuming the
validity of the least restrictive alternative doctrine, the only distin-
guishing feature of jurisdiction is the court's ultimate power to coerce
the child's acceptance of treatment.
Jurisdiction over "incorrigible" youths can thus be justified only
if there exists a class of minors described by the statute who require
treatment but will not voluntarily submit to it. Furthermore, even if
such a class exists, incorrigibility jurisdiction is unjustified if all mem-
bers of the class demonstrate behavior which indicates that they are
more appropriately described as either dependent208 or delinquent 0 9
children. 10
206. Arguments for and against repeal of jurisdiction over incorrigible minors fre-
quently involve discussion of runaways. These debates reflect differences in attitudes
concerning the child's right to self-determination and the parents' right to custody, the
act of running away, the uses to which the juvenile court currently puts its power, and
the ability of the communities to develop their own treatment facilities. Compare Cal.
Hearing, supra note 2, at 125 (children cannot be given total freedom regarding such
significant decisions), with SYMPOsiUm LEGISLATrVE PRoPosALs, supra note 118, at 1-
9 (possibility that competency requirements could replace double standard for children).
Compare Cal. Hearing, supra note 2, at 159-60 (must help distraught parents find chil-
dren), with Kleinfeld, The Balance of Power Among Infants, Their Parents and the
State, 4 FAMILY L.Q. 409, 439-40, 442-43 (1970) (runaway may acquire valuable bar-
gaining power with parents). Compare Moran interview, supra note 16 (repeal of 601
jurisdiction would necessitate increase in delinquency petitions), with ASsEMBLY IN-
TERIm CoMMITrEE ON CRmINAL PROCEDURE, 1970 INTRnm SESSION OF THE CALiFORNrA
LEGISLATURE, JUvENILE CouRT PROcESSES 26 (601 petitions used currently when insuffi-
dent evidence for 602 petition). Compare Payne & Brunelle interview, supra note 18
(outside alternatives cannot provide adequate services), with McNulty, The Right to Be
Left Alone, 11 AM. CrMm. L. REv. 141, 156 (1972) (communities will become moti-
vated when unable to avoid responsibilities).
207. Cal. Hearing, supra note 2, at 74, 115 (in the areas of pregnancy and com-
municable diseases).
208. CAL. WELE. & INST'NS CODE § 600 (West 1972). Section 600 includes a pro-
vision describing minors who are dangerous to the public because of mental or physical
abnormalities. Id. § 600(c). The remaining sections describe children who either lack
proper parental control, are destitute, or live in an otherwise unfit home. See id. § 600
(a), (b), (d).
209. Id. § 602.
210. It has been proposed that even if there are any remaining cases, they are mar-
ginal at best and should be eliminated from court jurisdiction in light of the system's
notable lack of success with them. ASSEMBLY INTERIM COMMITrEE ON CRIMINAL PRO-
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It seems particularly improbable that there exists a group of run-
aways who require 601 jurisdiction. Runaways may need help if they
are destitute and lack shelter yet refuse the assistance offered by a
runaway house. These youths may be described as dependent chil-
dren.211 In addition, some might become involved in self-destruc-
tive behavior, such as drug addiction or alcoholism, which renders
them oblivious of or antagonistic toward offers of help. These minors
would be most appropriately described as either dependent 212 or de-
linquent. If, on the other hand, the child has simply left home be-
cause he or she is happier elsewhere, and if the minor is neither desti-
tute nor self-destructive, it might be argued that treatment should not
be demanded. Furthermore, many runaways currently refuse help
only because they fear law enforcement intervention. Similarly, they
are reluctant to contact their parents because they might be forced to
return home. Moreover, it seems apparent that treatment is more ef-
fective when it is voluntarily offered and accepted.213
Legislation-An Introduction
Current legislative measures, both state and federal, reflect recog-
nition of the necessity for fundamental change in the framework
within which runaways are handled. Moreover, legislation on both
levels provides possibilities for successfully developing the range of
community-based alternatives needed for implementation of the most
promising theories for change.
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act
The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974214
("the Act") was enacted on September 7, 1974. This act was orig-
CEDURE, 1970 INTLitm SESSION OF THE CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE, JUVENILE COURT
PROCESSES 39.
211. These youths are in fact described by two subsections of section 600 of the
Welfare and Institutions Code, as they may be viewed both as destitute minors and as
children who have no parent actually exercising control. See CAL. WELF. & INST'NS
CODE § 600(a), (b) (West 1972).
212. An alcoholic or drug addicted youth is most appropriately described by section
600(c) as a minor suffering a physical or mental disorder. This section, however, would
be even more appropriate if it provided for jurisdiction over minors who are dangerous
to themselves as well as over those who endanger the public. See CAL. WELF. & INST'NS
CODE § 600(c) (West 1972).
213. Proponents of the right to treatment argument often assert that the right to
treatment must include the right to refuse treatment. See Gough, The Beyond-Control
Child and the Right to Treatment: An Exercise in the Synthesis of Paradox, 16 ST.
Louis U.L.J. 182, 187 (1971). This view is motivated by the theory that the only ef-
fective treatment must be treatment of choice. Id. at 193.
214. 88 Stat. 1109-43 (codified in scattered sections of 18, 42 U.S.C.A. (Supp.
1975)).
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inally introduced as two separate measures, the Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention Act of 1972215 and the Runaway Youth
Act.21 6 While the Runaway Youth Act, Title III of the comprehensive
measure, is the only portion which speaks directly to the problems of
runaways, it deals with only that segment of the runaway population
which successfully evades the juvenile justice system. Runaways are
also significantly affected by the Act as a whole, which concerns all
youths currently subject to juvenile court jurisdiction.
The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974
recognizes the "devastating failures of the juvenile justice system
... 2 7 By enabling research, experimentation, evaluation, and
training, the Act aims at identifying the most effective methods for pre-
vention, diversion, and treatment of delinquency and for implement-
ing these methods throughout the nation. The Act expresses the clear
legislative intent that states be offered the incentive to move toward
minimizing contact between law enforcement personnel and noncrim-
inal juvenile "offenders," particularly runaways. At the same time, it
reflects a realistic view of the present state of juvenile justice and of-
fers assistance for innovative experiments within as well as without the
juvenile court framework.
Basic Structure
Funding under the Act is to be administered largely through the
Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, a newly-cre-
ated arm of the Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration. 2 1s  This office, headed by an assistant administrator,
is directed to provide technical and economic assistance to "Federal,
State, and local governments, courts, public and private agencies, in-
stitutions, and individuals, in the planning, establishment, funding, op-
eration, or evaluation of juvenile delinquency programs."21 9
Aided by an independent Coordinating Council composed of de-
cisionmakers from a variety of federal agencies, 220 and by a National
Advisory Committee consisting of experts throughout the country in
prevention and treatment of delinquency, 2 1 the office will develop
overall policy and goals for all federal programs concerning delin-
215. S. 3128, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
216. S. 2829, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
217. Juvenile Justice & Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 § 101(a)(6), 42
U.S.C.A. § 5601 (Supp. 1975).
218. Id. § 201(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 5611. The Runaway Youth Act, however, is ad-
ministered through the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. Id. § 303, 42
U.S.C.A. § 5702.
219. Id. § 204(b)(7), 42U.S.C.A. § 5614.
220. Id. § 206, 42 U.S.C.A. § 5616.
221. Id. § 207, 42 U.S.C.A. § 5617.
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quency, 222 including all programs funded through the Act.22 In two
annual reports to the president and Congress, the office will present
both an evaluation of the programs funded224 and a plan for the co-
ordination of programs.225 This plan is to focus particularly on de-
linquency prevention methods and diversion programs.226
The office is also to supervise a National Institute for Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Prevention.227 The institute is chiefly a re-
search and information service, organized to gather, analyze and eval-
uate data relating to treatment alternatives and to disseminate both
data and findings to the federal government and to interested individ-
uals. 228  Institute studies are to result in the development of training
programs, seminars, and workshops for law enforcement and lay per-
sonnel in the most effective of the alternative programs.229
Funding Mechanisms
State Plans
Grants under the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
Act are disbursed through two distinct routes. The first involves "for-
mula grants" to state and local governments. 3 °  Minimum state al-
lotments of $200,000231 are authorized to states presenting a "state
plan" which satisfies requirements outlined in the Act concerning uses
to which federal funds may be put and structure needed for receipt
and disbursal of funds within the state.232 The plan is to be adminis-
tered by a state planning agency advised by a group of citizens includ-
ing personnel from govenment, law enforcement, and public agen-
cies 233 and representatives of private organizations dealing with de-
linquency prevention and treatment, 234 at least one-third of whom
must be under the age of twenty-six. 35  A minimum of 66% percent
222. Id. § 204(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 5614.
223. Id. § 103(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 5603.
224. Id. § 204(b)(5), 42 U.S.C.A. § 5614.
225. Id. § 204(b)(6), 42 U.S.C.A. § 5614.
226. Id.
227. Id. 99 241-51, 42 U.S.C.A. § 5651-61. A separate provision of the Act es-
tablishes a similarly structured program within the Bureau of Prisons to deal exclusively
with corrections. Id. § 521, 18 U.S.C.A. § 4351-53 (Supp. 1975).
228. See id. § 241(f), 42 U.S.C.A. § 5651 (Supp. 1975).
229. Id. § 244(2), (3), 42 U.S.C.A. § 5654.
230. Id. 99 221-23, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 5631-33.
231. Id. § 222(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 5632.
232. Id. § 223, 42 U.S.C.A. § 5633. One of the requirements is that the plan be
consistent with specified provisions of the Omnibus Crime Control & Safe Streets Act
of 1968, 82 Stat. 197 (codified in scattered sections of 18, 42 U.S.C. (1970)).
233. Juvenile Justice & Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 § 223(a)(3)(B), 42
U.S.C.A. § 5633 (Supp. 1975).
234. Id. § 223(a)(3)(C), 42 U.S.C.A. § 5633.
235. Id. § 223(a)(3)(E), 42 U.S.C.A. § 5633. The House bill, H.R. 15276, re-
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of each state's allotment is to be passed on to local government agen-
cies for distribution to local programs consistent with the state plan.
This pass-through provision may be waived, however, if the state's
delinquency prevention or treatment programs are developed on a
statewide basis. 236
Basic to the state plan is that it must contain evidence that its
implementation will not be thwarted by state law. 3 7 Furthermore,
among the measures with which state legislation must prove compati-
ble is the use of at least 75 percent of the total state allotment for
development of "advanced techniques" in delinquency prevention, di-
version programs, and community-based alternatives to detention and
correctional facilities.238 Such techniques include group homes and
halfway houses, community programs for parents, educational serv-
ices, training programs for probation officers, and statewide mech-
anisms for reducing juvenile incarceration and detention rates.239
"Special Emphasis" Programs
In addition to funding through state and local governments, the
Act provides for grants to public and private organizations and to
individuals for "special emphasis prevention and treatment pro-
grams." 240  These programs are to involve allocation of between 25
and 50 percent of the total funds appropriated for state and local pro-
grams.24' Of this percentage, a minimum of 20 percent is to be made
available specifically for use by experienced private nonprofit facilities
for youth.2 42  As under the formula grant sections, programs consid-
ered for funding include those aimed at diversion24 3 and commu-
nity-based treatment 24 4 and those focusing on improving services to
quired that at least two of the members must have been under juvenile court jurisdiction.
This provision was deleted, but the Joint Explanatory Statement of the conference com-
mittee which developed the final measure noted that "the appointment of such persons
... is to be encouraged, by virtue of their invaluable and unique experiences which
could broaden the perspective of State Planning Agencies." Joint Explanatory Statement
of the Committee of Conference, August 16, 1974, at 41.
236. Juvenile Justice & Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 § 223(a)(5), 42
U.S.C.A. § 5633 (Supp. 1975).
237. Id. § 223(a)(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 5633.
238. Id. § 223(a) (10), 42 U.S.C.A. § 5633.
239. Id. § 223(a)(10)(A)-(H), 42U.S.C.A. § 5633.
240. Id. § 224-25, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 5634-35.
241. Id. § 224(b), 42 U.S.C.A. § 5634. Funds authorized for appropriation for
the Office, Institute, and state and local grants total $75,000,000 for fiscal 1975,
$125,000,000 for fiscal 1976, and $150,000,000 for fiscal 1977. Id. § 261(a), 42
U.S.C.A. § 5671.
242. Id. § 224(c), 42 U.S.C.A. § 5634.
243. Id. § 224(a)(3), 42 U.S.C.A. § 5634.
244. Id. § 224(a)(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 5634.
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"delinquents and youths in danger of becoming delinquent. '2 45 Eligi-
bility for these grants depends in part on the extent to which the pro-
gram will involve innovative techniques246 and on the compatibility of
the program with the state plan, when feasible.2 4' Moreover, if a
state plan is deliberately not submitted or unacceptable, the state allot-
ment will be made available generally for special emphasis pro-
grams. 248  If the state plan fails through "oversight or neglect,"
the office will "endeavor" to make the allotment available for spe-
cial emphasis programs within that state.24 9
The Runaway Youth Act
The Runaway Youth Act,250 Title III of the Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, consists of two parts, one dealing
with funding for runaway programs and the other with plans for a
statistical survey. Grants are to be disbursed for the establishment
or maintenance by states, localities, and nonprofit private agencies of
one specific type of facility, the runaway house, "a locally controlled
facility providing temporary shelter, and counseling services to juve-
niles who have left home without permission of their parents or guard-
* "251ians.
The provisions of Title III are generally the same as those pro-
posed when the act was originally introduced in November of 1971.252
The measure is premised on the notion that "the problem of locat-
ing, detaining, and returning runaway children should not be the re-
sponsibility of already overburdened police departments and juve-
nile justice authorities .. ".."253 The runaway house is designed
principally to provide the child with an alternative to the street which
is beyond the jurisdiction of the juvenile justice system, to furnish the
minor with short-term bed and board, to offer counseling both to the
child and, when feasible, to the parents, and to insure a speedy family
reunion. 254
To qualify for funding, a house may hold a maximum of twenty
youths255 and must be located in an area easily accessible to them.
2 6
245. Id. § 224(a)(4), 42 U.S.C.A. § 5634.
246. Id. § 225(c)(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 5635.
247. Id. § 225(c)(3), 42 U.S.C.A. § 5635.
248. Id. § 223(d), 42 U.S.C.A. § 5633.
249. Id. § 223(e), 42 U.S.C.A. § 5633.
250. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 5701-02, 5711-13, 5715-16, 5731-32, 5751 (Supp. 1975).
251. Runaway Youth Act § 312(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 5712 (Supp. 1975).
252. S. 2829, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
253. Runaway Youth Act § 302(4), 42 U.S.C.A. § 5701 (Supp. 1975).
254. Id. § 312, 42 U.S.C.A. § 5712; see id. § 311, 42 U.S.C.A. § 5711.
255. Id. § 312(b)(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 5712.
256. Id. § 312(b)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 5712.
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Grant amounts are determined by the size of the communty's runaway
population and the adequacy of available services; priority is given
to private facilities with past experience.25 7 Appropriations authorized
total $10,000,000 per year for the fiscal years 1975, 1976, and
1977."' An additional $500,000 is to be expended on a statistical
survey259 which aims at a clearer definition of the runaway popula-
tion through compilation of data on age, sex, and background. It is
hoped that the study will indicate the types of locales to and from
which runaways run and will reveal whether or not runaway beha-
vior can be linked to any other deviant acts. 60
Despite the general similarity in provisions throughout the his-
tory of the Runaway Youth Act, a comparison of the eligibility re-
quirements and effectiveness criteria of the present act with those of
the drafts introduced in the Ninety-second Congress2"l and the first
session of the Ninety-third Congress26 - reveals several changes which
reflect recent shifts in attitudes concerning the adequate treatment of
runaways. The present act emphasizes the child's need for confiden-
tiality and eliminates previous mention of the need for alleviating
parental anxiety through effective interstate reporting and immediate
parent-child contact.2 63 Similarly, while all drafts mention the devel-
opment of adequate plans for contacting parents, the second copy
added the qualifying phrase "in accordance with the law of the State
in which the runaway house is established .... ,,264 This addition
indicates that this requirement is more a matter of compliance with
state law than an expression of legislative intent. The present act is
even more explicit, requiring plans for contacting parents only "(if
such action is required by State Law) . . ,265 Along with the di-
lution of the reporting requirement, the present act adds for the first
time provisions which protect from disclosure both the records of run-
away houses2 66 and data gathered by the nationwide statistical sur-
vey. 207
257. Id. § 311, 42 U.S.C.A. § 5711. See note 242 & accompanying text supra.
Priority is also given to grants under $75,000 and to applicants with program budgets
smaller than $100,000. Runaway Youth Act § 313, 42 U.S.C-A. § 5713 (Supp. 1975).
258. Runaway Youth Act § 331(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 5751 (Supp. 1975).
259. Id. § 331(b), 42 U.S.C.A. § 5751. These appropriations are separate from
those authorized for formula grants and special emphasis programs under Title II.
260. Id. § 321, 42 U.S.C.A. § 5731.
261. S. 2829, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
262. S. 645, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
263. See S. 2829, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(4) (1971); Fed. Hearings, supra note
16, at 3. This portion appears neither in S. 645 nor in the present Runaway Youth
Act.
264. S. 645, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 102(b) (3); 119 CoNG. Ric. 2659 (1973).
265. Runaway Youth Act § 312(b) (3), 42 U.S.C.A. § 5712 (Supp. 1975).
266. Id. § 312(b)(6), 42 U.S.C.A. § 5712.
267. Id. § 322, 42 U.S.C.A. § 5732.
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The original measure also indicated uncertainty about the rela-
tion betweeen runaway houses and the juvenile justice system in its
provision requiring that houses deal with children "in a manner which,
whenever possible, is outside the law enforcement structure and the
juvenile justice system. ' 26  Subsequent versions delete the phrase
"whenever possible," 269 indicating that effective functioning of this
type of treatment requires that it be a true alternative to the system.2
Other changes in the three versions suggest development of the
attitude that simple return home should not be the ultimate goal of a
runaway house. Although "strengthening family relationships and en-
couraging stable living conditions for children" has remained a crite-
rion for measuring a runaway house's effectiveness throughout,27' the
present act includes an additional measure of success: "effectiveness
in helping youth decide upon a future course of action.1272  Thus,
that the runaway will return home is no longer a foregone conclusion.
These changes do not indicate that families should not try to
work out their differences. In fact, the requirement that runaway
houses arrange for after care family counseling has been amplified.Y
Nevertheless, the resolution of family problems, it is suggested, might
necessarily take place before the return home, or even without a re-
turn home.
Throughout the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act
of 1974, Congress has made explicit its intent that all children must,
as far as possible, be diverted from the juvenile justice system and be
268. S. 2829, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 101 (1971).
269. See Runaway Youth Act § 311, 42 U.S.C.A. § 5711 (Supp. 1975); S. 645, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. § 101(a) (1973).
270. In spite of these clarifications, however, ambiguities remain. The addition of
a provision for "contacting local government officials pursuant to informal arrangements
established with such officials by the runaway house" is not clearly explained and seems
on its face to be at odds with the increased attention to confidentiality and handling
outside the juvenile justice system. See Runaway Youth Act § 312(b) (3), 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 5712 (Supp. 1975). Related to this unclear provision is the requirement that runaway
houses "develop an adequate plan for assuring proper relations with law enforcement
personnel." Id. § 312(b)(4), 42 U.S.C.A. § 5712. If an "adequate plan" involves too
much contact with authorities, the effectiveness of the program might well be under-
mined because children with severe problems will fear using the houses. See text ac-
companying note 107 supra.
271. Runaway Youth Act § 315(3), 42 U.S.C.A. § 5715 (Supp. 1975); S. 645, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. § 105(3) (1973); S. 2829, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 105(4) (1971).
272. Runaway Youth Act § 315(4), 42 U.S.C.A. § 5715 (Supp. 1975).
273. The original draft required that runaway houses arrange for aftercare coun-
seling of parents and child within a 25 mile radius of the house. The two later versions
both make the provision for such counseling mandatory for families within the state and
stress that it should be available as far as possible for out-of-state children, as well.
Compare S. 2829, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 102(b) (5) (1971), with Runaway Youth Act
§ 312(b) (5), 42 U.S.C.A. § 5712 (Supp. 1975), and S. 645, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 102
(b)(5) (1973).
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kept from institutionalization. The Act as a whole offers help to run-
aways by providing funds for the development of state and local facifi-
ties to offer these minors effective treatment by the least restrictive
means possible even while they retain their predelinquent status under
state laws. Nevertheless, the fact that the specific measure within the
Act which directly addresses runaways provides funds only for treat-
ment beyond juvenile court jurisdiction leaves little doubt that in the
eyes of Congress, law enforcement control of runaways is wholly in-
appropriate. Moreover, the changes in successive drafts of the Runa-
way Youth Act suggest that removal of juvenile court control of runa-
ways is only a partial remedy for the problems of these minors. Per-
sonnel both within and outside the juvenile justice system must fo-
cus treatment efforts on identifying the specific future plan appropri-
ate for each particular child, and this determination must take into
account the fact that not all children belong at home.
California Legislation
The federal Act offers the possibility of funding to a variety of
California runaway facilities. Runaway houses, it would seem, are
eligible for funding under special emphasis,2 74 state allocation,2 75 and
Runaway Youth Act2 76 provisions. In addition, either special empha-
sis or state allocation monies could be used to expand or improve both
the Alameda County diversion project 277 and the Matin County Chil-
dren's Treatment center,278 as well as to renovate San Francisco's out-
moded runaway-processing system. 2 To qualify for state funding,
California must enact legislation which will enable the formation of an
adequate state plan.28 °
274. Juvenile Justice & Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 §§ 224-25, 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 5634-35 (Supp. 1975).
275. Id. §§ 221-23, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 5631-33.
276. Runaway Youth Act § 311, 42 U.S.C.A. § 5711 (Supp. 1975). Private non-
profit facilities with prior experience are given priority under both the Runaway Youth
Act and the special emphasis provisions. Id.; see Juvenile Justice & Delinquency Pre-
vention Act of 1974 § 224(c), 42 U.S.C.A. § 5634 (Supp. 1975). See note 257 & ac-
companying text supra.
277. See notes 54-64 & accompanying text supra.
278. See notes 93-99 & accompanying text supra.
279. Revision of San Francisco facilities through a state or local plan would insure
development of badly-needed alternatives for female runaways. Compare notes 88-91,
& accompanying text supra, with Juvenile Justice & Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974
§ 223(a)(15), 42 U.S.C.A. § 5633 (Supp. 1975) (state plan must ensure females as-
sisted on equitable basis).
280. The chairman of the California Senate hearings on runaways articulated his
anticipation of this need when he remarked at the conclusion of the December 1973 ses-
sion": [The Senate Select Committee on Children and Youth is] going to draft some
legislation to conform with the federal Act .... I doubt seriously if we would be able
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Current California legislative proposals affecting runaways are
largely the result of the Assembly Symposium on Services to Children
and Youth, a body created in May of 1973. The symposium,
headed by an eighteen member steering committee, was divided into
task forces which studied special areas of concern.2s8 The steering
committee and the Assembly Office of Research analyzed task force
recommendations and drafted a series of proposals.28 2
The proposals reflect a conscious effort to develop legislation
which will enable California to qualify for federal funding under the
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974. The in-
adequacy of these measures, however, lies largely in the fact that
while they all aim at presenting an appropriate structure for funding,
none demonstrates a sensitivity to the intent of the federal Act to enable
diversion and treatment outside the juvenile justice system of youths
currently subject to its control. For example, the two state bills most
clearly fashioned with federal funding in mind288 do not concentrate
at all on the problems of juvenile justice and delinquency prevention.
Instead, they propose comprehensive plans which purportedly will
improve all services to juveniles but which in fact pay scant attention
to the very children whose problems were of central concern to the
federal legislators. 8 4  Furthermore, the federal measure, consistent
with the Constitution, demands certain substantive changes in a funded
state's handling of runaways for which the California proposals fail to
allow.
28 5
The single proposal which does directly affect the juvenile justice
system amends several sections of the Welfare and Institutions Code,
among them section 601. It provides an incrementally harsh system
of dispositional alternatives and distinguishes among the different
types of behavior for which they may be invoked.2 86  The bill ap-
to get any money from the state unless the federal Bayh bill passes and gives us federal
matching funds." Cal. Hearing, supra note 2, at 168 (remarks of Sen. Dymally).
281. ASSEMBLY OFFICE OF RESEARCH, CALIFORNIA CHILDREN: WHO CARES?, A
PROGRESS REPORT ON THE CALIFoRNIA ASSEMBLY SYMPOSIrM ON SERVICES TO CHIL-
DREN AND YOuTH 2 (1974).
282. California Assembly Symposium on Services to Children and Youth, Commu-
nication, June 3, 1974 (introductory page).
283. A.B. 4307 (1973-74); A.B. 4279 (1973-74).
284. See notes 300-25 & accompanying text infra.
285. See notes 295-99, 306-07, 322-25 & accompanying text infra.
286. A.B. 4120 (1973-74). Proposed section 601(a) contains substantially the
same language as the present section 601, except that the portion relating to a minor
"who from any cause is in danger of leading an idle, dissolute, lewd, or immoral life"
is deleted and a new portion describing "any person who commits an age-specific of-
fense" is added. Id. § 2 (Proposed CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 601 (a) [hereinafter
cited as Proposed WELF. CODE]). An "age-specific offense" is defined as "an act that
is prohibited by law solely on the basis of the age of the perpetrator." Id. § 2 (Pro-
posed WELF. CODE § 601(d)). In addition, a minor described in proposed section 601
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parently seeks to cure the vulnerability of section 601 to void-for-
vagueness attack both by adding particularity to the statute's terms
and by excising the "lewd and immoral" clause, the portion most ef-
fectively challenged for its vagueness.2"7 Moreover, Assembly Bill 4120
specifically rejects the present provision by which a child adjudged to
come within section 601 may subsequently be found to be a delinquent
under section 602 for violation of a court order.288 Thus, Youth Au-
thority commitments are reserved solely for those who commit acts
which would be criminal if done by adults. In addition, the bill in-
sures that the only possible disposition following the first finding of
601 jurisdiction is informal probation for six months or less.28 9
Two provisions within Assembly Bill 4120 seem particularly -to
have been drafted with qualification for federal funding in mind. The
first of these measures.290 allows for parental custody of even the
most serious 601 offenders,291 on the condition that both parents and
child seek counseling.292 This provision helps to meet the require-
ment in the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974
that a state be able to apply the major part of its allocation to the de-
velopment of advanced treatment techniques, including community-
based programs aimed at strengthening the family unit so that more
youths may remain at home.293  The second proposed section 294 spe-
cifies that most 601 minors may be housed or detained only in a "non-
secure juvenile facility" 295 which may not include a juvenile hall,
ranch, or camp.29 6 This provision suggests an effort to comply with
(a) could not be made a ward of the court. Wardship could, however, be invoked if
a minor adjudged to come within section 601(a) violated the terms of an informal pro-
bation agreement or ran away from a nonsecure facility prior to disposition of his case.
Id. (Proposed WELF. CODE § 601(b)). A further provision describes a minor adjudged
a ward of the court who subsequently violates a court order. Id. (Proposed WETF. CODE
§ 601(c)).
287. See notes 123-40, 286 & accompanying text supra.
288. Compare A.B. 4120 § 3 (1973-74) (Proposed WELF. CODE at § 602), with
CAL. WELF. & INST'Ns CODE § 602 (West 1972).
289. A.B. 4120 § 4 (1973-74) (Proposed WELF. CODE § 725(a)). See note 286
supra.
290. A.B. 4120 § 5 (1973-74) (Proposed WELF. CODE § 727(e)).
291. The section concerns minors adjudged wards of the court under proposed sec-
tions 601(b) or 601(c). See note 286 supra.
292. Compare CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 727 (West 1972), which requires that
parents of children found dependent under section 600(d) because their homes are unfit
must, if they are allowed to maintain custody, participate in counseling programs.
293. Juvenile Justice & Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 § 223 (a) (10) (B), 42
U.S.C.A. § 5633 (Supp. 1975).
294. A.B. 4120 § 1 (1973-74) (Proposed WELF. CODE § 506.1 (a)).
295. This term refers to a community facility in which no physical restrictions are
placed on a child's movement. A.B. 4120 § 1 (1973-74) (Proposed WELF. CODE §
506.1(c)).
296. Id.
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the federal requirement for assurance that within two years after sub-
mission of a state plan, youthful offenders whose acts would not be
criminal for an adult be placed only in shelter facilities rather than
in juvenile detention or correctional facilities.297 Nevertheless, this
measure does not meet the federal specification, as it insures this treat-
ment neither for the most serious of 601 offenders 298 nor for minors
who run away from nonsecure facilities.29
A second assembly bill3 0 would establish a California Policy De-
velopment and Research Institute for Children and Youth, strikingly
similar in structure to the National Institute for Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention described in Title II of the federal Act.30' The
formation of such a body is clearly directed toward federal funding
qualifications: the federal law requires that a state plan provide for
"the development of an adequate research, training, and evaluation
capacity within the State."30 2  Like the federal institute, the California
body would undertake the gathering, evaluation, and dissemination of
information, 0 3 would encourage demonstration projects,30 4 and would
297. Juvenile Justice & Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 § 223(a)(12), 42
U.S.C.A. § 5633 (Supp. 1975). Moreover, the Act explicitly provides that a state plan
must contain evidence that the state agency administering the plan will have the author-
ity "by legislation, if necessary. . ." to implement a program which conforms to federal
specifications. Id. § 223(a)(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 5633 (Supp. 1975) (emphasis added).
See text accompanying note 237 supra.
298. See A.B. 4120 § 1 (1973-74) (Proposed WELF. CODE § 506.1(a)) (nonsecure
facilities required for section 601(a) and (b) minors only).
299. Id. Minors who run away from a nonsecure facility are described in proposed
section 601(b). Proposed section 506.1(a) would thus permit juvenile hall detention for
even a first-time runaway if he or she ran from a nonsecure facility. In addition, a
child could still be subject to placement with a public agency for nothing more than run-
ning from nonsecure detention or violating a minor term of informal probation. See
A.B. 4120 § 5 (1973-74) (Proposed WELE. CoDE § 727). If a minor ran twice from
a placement, he or she could be sent to a juvenile home, ranch, or the like. See id.
§ 7 (Proposed WELF. CODE § 730). The simple act of running away, then, while it
could not lead to Youth Authority commitment, could result in the minor's subjection
to a considerable display of juvenile justice system control. A.B. 4120 should be
amended to eliminate such possibilities, both because they would hinder California's el-
igibility for federal funding and, more fundamentally, because they are inequitable.
300. A.B. 4279 (1973-74) (Proposed WELF. CODE §§ 18920-36).
301. Juvenile Justice & Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 9H 241-51, 42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 5651-61 (Supp. 1975). See notes 227-29 supra.
302. Juvenile Justice & Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 § 223(a)(11), 42
U.S.C.A. § 5633 (Supp. 1975).
303. Compare A.B. 4279 § 1 (1973-74) (Proposed WnLF. CODE 9H 18928, 18929
(d), (f), 18932), with Juvenile Justice & Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 § 241(f),
42 U.S.C.A. § 5651 (Supp. 1975).
304. Compare A.B. 4279 § 1 (1973-74) (Proposed WEr. CODE § 18934), with Ju-
venile Justice & Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 § 243(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 5653
(Supp. 1975).
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develop seminar and workshop programs.3 °5 The chief difference lies
not in the structure, but more significantly, in the focus of the infor-
mation-gathering. While the federal institute is directed toward delin-
quency prevention, the California measure concerns planning for the
"whole child. 3 0 6  While the compilation, analysis, and promulgation
of information about the effectiveness of programs dealing with all
youth are admirable pursuits, the facility which the federal Act re-
quires is one dedicated to discovering effective means of delinquency
prevention and treatment.30 7
The third proposal, the Family and Youth Services Act,308 would
provide the structural framework for an adequate state plan. It
would include development of many of the types of programs specifi-
cally suggested by the federal Act in its description of a state plan.
Among the proposed California programs are rehabilitative and foster
care services, residential group homes, programs to work with par-
ents on improvement of family life, homemaker services, shelter care,
and supervised instruction.30 9 The measure also provides for services
to youth "caretakers."3 10
A Family, Children, and Youth Services Agency31' would fill the
role of the state planning agency described in the federal legislation.312
The agency's secretary would approve all budget requests for services,
apply for federal funds, provide information and technical assistance,
and generally promote the development of services.313  In an annual
305. Compare A.B. 4279 § 1 (1973-74) (Proposed WELF. CODE § 18933), with Ju-
venile Justice & Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 § 244(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 5654
(Supp. 1975).
306. SYMPosIUM LEGISLATIvE PROPOSALS, supra note 118, at I-1 (1974). The In-
stitute would be directed at exploring services for all children, not only those involved
with the juvenile justice system.
307. For example, the Act recognizes that the high incidence of juvenile delin-
quency in the United States requires "immediate and comprehensive action by the Fed-
eral Government to reduce and prevent delinquency." Juvenile Justice & Delinquency
Prevention Act of 1974 § 101(b), 42 U.S.C.A. § 5601 (Supp. 1975) (emphasis added).
308. A.B. 4307 (1973-74) (Proposed CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 38000-10, 38100-14,
38200-12, 38300-03, 38400-10, 39500-11, 38600-26, 38700-06, 38750 [hereinafter cited
as Proposed EDUC.CODE]; Proposed CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 15950, 15950.1-.5, 15951,
15951.5, 15952-56, 15960-61 [hereinafter cited as Proposed Gov'T CODE].
309. A.B. 4307 § 27 (1973-74) (Proposed EDUC. CODE §§ 38105-06, 38113(b),-
(d)); see Juvenile Justice & Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 § 223(a) (10) (A),
(B), (E), 42 U.S.C.A. § 5633 (Supp. 1975).
310. "Caretakers" include foster parents, probation officers, teachers, social work-
ers, and others with "similar responsibilities." A.B. 4307 § 27 (1973-74) (Proposed
EDuc. CODE § 38107).
311. A.B. 4307 § 29 (1973-74) (Proposed Gov'T CODE §§ 15950, 15950.1-.5,
15951, 15951.5, 15952-56, 15960-61).
312. See notes 233-35 & accompanying text supra.
313. A.B. 4307 § 29 (1973-74) (Proposed Gov'T ComE § 15961).
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state plan, the secretary would evaluate present services and recom-
mend priorities for the future.3"4
A State Family, Children and Youth Services Council 315 would be
the equivalent of the advisory group specified in the federal Act.310
The council would be composed of directors of various state depart-
ments, including the Youth Authority, persons under eighteen, parents
or caretakers, representatives of service agencies, and district council
members.3 1 7  Its function would involve clarification of state policies
and goals and funding and evaluation of community pilot projects.3 18
In a Statewide Goals and Policy report, submitted to the legislature
every four years, the council would summarize state programs and
recommend executive and legislative action to meet the goals it de-
fined. Furthermore, the council could consult the legislature at any
time. 19 This proposal also provides for district councils, the equiva-
lent of the federal Act's local agencies,320 which would determine local
needs, develop plans conforming with the state plan, make project
requests to the state council and agency, and voice opinions on state
funding proposals.32'
The chief difficulty with the Family and Youth Services Act is
that it is heavily weighted toward the implementation of day care,
health and educational facilities for young children. For example, an
entire chapter of the bill is devoted to provisions for "child develop-
ment services, '322 child care programs concerned largely with devel-
opment of educational skills in children up to the age of fourteen
whose parents are involved in training programs, are employed, or
are physically or mentally unsound. 23  Although the bill does involve
some juvenile justice system personnel,3 -4 it expresses no direct con-
cern with the treatment or prevention of delinquency. In fact, it
seems to avoid discussion of services required by delinquent and pre-
delinquent youth.3 25
On the other hand, if the bill were amended to reflect this fo-
cus, its structure could be of critical importance to qualification for
314. Id. (Proposed Gov'T CODE § 15961 (m)).
315. Id. § 27 (Proposed EDUC. CODE H§ 38200-12, 38300-03, 38400-10, 38500-11).
316. See note 221 & accompanying text supra.
317. A.B. 4307 § 27 (Proposed EDuc. CODE § 38200).
318. Id. (Proposed EDUC. CODE §§ 38400-10).
319. Id. (Proposed EDUC. CODE §§ 38500-11).
320. See note 236 & accompanying text supra.
321. A.B. 4307 § 27 (1973-74) (Proposed EDUC. CODE § 38700-06).
322. Id. (Proposed EDUC. CODE § 38600-26).
323. Id. (Proposed EDUC. CODE § 38113).
324. See notes 310, 317 & accompanying text supra.
325. For example, it makes no mention whatever of the necessity for diversion pro-
grams.
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federal funding generally and to programs for runaways in particular.
Since the Act facilitates contact between the state council and the leg-
islature,32 16 the council could indicate the specific legislative changes
necessary for a state plan acceptable under the federal Act. 2 7
For example, it could point to the requirement that a state plan
must assure that services will be offered to females and other disad-
vantaged youth on an equitable basis.12s  The comparatively meager
facilities for females in San Francisco suggest that such assurance
would require legislation aimed at alleviating the current imbalance.
Furthermore, the council could review current proposals and identify
such insufficiencies as the overly-restrictive detention provision in As-
sembly Bill 4120.29
The state council is also required to review all state regulations
for services to youth, identify points of conflict between these regula-
tions and desired goals and policies, and advise the legislature and
executive concerning needed changes.330 Moreover, the secretary of
Family, Children, and Youth Services, who is to establish licensing
and approval standards for group care facilities, foster homes, place-
ment agencies, and children's centers,331 is to be a member of the state
council332 and would be in an optimal position for urging statutory
changes. Community runaway house personnel often stress that rigor-
ous licensing requirements hinder the development of neighborhood-
supervised facilities.333 Any attempt to provide services to youth com-
patible with the federal emphasis on community treatment must rec-
ognize that these licensing requirements are largely unrelated to the
particular facility's effectiveness 334 and should be reexamined. Spe-
cial attention should also be paid to regulations requiring that a child
may not remain overnight at a runaway house without parental per-
mission.33' The Runaway Youth Act specifically provides that re-
quirements for contacting parents depend solely on state law.336  The
current state rule should be amended, as it presently requires that if
parents refuse permission, a child who will not return home must be
relegated to the streets.337  This result is clearly contrary to the intent
of the federal legislation.
326. See text accompanying notes 319 supra.
327. See notes 237, 297 & accompanying text supra.
328. See note 279 supra.
329. See notes 295-99 & accompanying text supra.
330. A.B. 4307 § 27 (1973-74) (Proposed EDUC. CODE §§ 38509-11).
331. A.B. 4307 § 29 (1973-74) (Proposed Gov'T CODE § 15961(d)).
332. Id. (Proposed Gov'T CoDo § 15961(a)).
333. E.g., Cal. Hearing, supra note 2, at 86.
334. See, e.g., id. at 74-75.
335. See note 108 & accompanying text supra.
336. See note 265 & accompanying text supra.
337. See note 108 & accompanying text supra.
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The Runaway Youth Act offers the possibility for the development
of adequate resources in the community to take on a responsibility
which cannot validly remain in the juvenile justice system. Under the
provisions of the Family and Youth Services Act, the state council
must assure that this possibility is not thwarted by technical require-
ments, especially since children's lives are at stake.s 8
Conclusion
If the coercive power of the juvenile court may validly be applied
to any minors who have committed no acts proscribed for adults, this
power must be used only to channel these youths into the least restric-
tive facilities providing effective treatment. Programs within po-
lice or probation departments, however innovative, should be used
only if no equally effective facilities are available elsewhere. If
California legislation is amended to conform to federal funding re-
quirements specified in the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Preven-
tion Act of 1974, the state will be able to develop a network of consist-
ently competent facilities divorced from the juvenile justice system.339
Furthermore, the California courts and legislature must not cease
inquiry into the questionable validity of jurisdiction over minors de-
scribed in section 601 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. The sub-
jection of runaways to 601 jurisdiction is particularly suspect, as it
appears that any runaways who require court coercion for treatment
338. Several additional findings and recommendations of the California Assembly
Symposium on Services to Children and Youth task forces indicate attitudes which might
lead to further legislation. The Juvenile Justice Task Force has recommended that in-
take procedures for 601 minors should be community-based and that these youths should
simply be counseled by private nonprofit social service agencies with help from local
probation department staff. ASSEMBLY OFFICE OF RESEARCH, CALIFORNIA CILDREN:
WHO CARES?, A PROGRESS REPORT ON THE CALIFORNIA SYMPOSIUM ON SERVICES TO
CHILDREN AND YOUTH, at V-7, V-9. The group also suggests a study of diversion pro-
grams within the juvenile justice system and recommends the introduction into the next
legislative session of A.B. 2185, which would allow private nonprofit agencies eligibility
for diversion funding through the Office of Criminal Justice Planning. Id. at V-4, V-
10 to -16. The Symposium as a whole has drafted a bill of rights for children which
includes the declaration that "[yloung people have the right to equal protection of law."
Id. at 6. A discussion of the bill of rights led to the generation of a list of basic rights
to be considered by all people working with children. Among these rights were "choice
of alternative home and right to a 'parental voucher' for choice with whom a person
will live (which includes right to be supported and right to self-determination)" and "de-
criminalization of runaways." California Assembly Symposium on Services to Children
and Youth, Communication, June 3, 1974, at 2 (Group Discussion-Bill of Rights for
Children).
339. While adequate facilities outside the system must spell the end of police and
probation department programs, the most beneficial aspects of experiments such as those
in Main and Alameda Counties might well be adapted for community use.
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would be more effectively treated pursuant to findings of either delin-
quency or, more likely, neglect.
In addition, federal legislation has identified runaways as the one
group of minors who should only be treated in facilities unconnected
to the juvenile justice system. On a purely practical level, since runa-
ways are a discrete class, capable of precise definition, their removal
from 601 jurisdiction may be accomplished even without full-scale re-
vamping of the juvenile court law.
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